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This paper proposes a new methodology to evaluate the economic effect of state-
specific policy changes, using bank-branching deregulations in the U.S. as an 
example. The new method compares economic performance of contiguous counties 
on opposite sides of state borders, where on one side restrictions on statewide 
branching were removed relatively earlier, to create a natural “regression 
discontinuity” setup. The study uses a total of 285 pairs of contiguous counties along 
38 segments of such regulation change borders to estimate treatment effects for 23 
separate deregulation events. To distinguish real treatment effects from those created 
by data-snooping and spatial correlations, fictitious placebo deregulations are 
randomized (permutated) on another 32 segments of non-event borders to establish 
empirically a statistical table of critical values for the estimator. The method 
determines that statistically significant growth accelerations can be established at a > 
90% confidence level in five out of the 23 deregulation events examined. “Hinterland 
counties” within the still-regulated states, but farther away from the state borders, are 
used as a second control group to consider and reject the possibility that cross-border 
spillover of deregulation effects may invalidate the empirical design.  
JEL Classification: G21; G28; O43 
Keywords: Banking deregulation; Economic growth; Regression discontinuity 
   
Non-technical summary 
 
This paper designs a new methodology to evaluate the effects of policy changes 
that are specific to sub-national regions. The main idea is to compare two neighboring 
geographic units that are separated by a political border, but are otherwise very similar, to 
exploit the policy differences that sometimes arise across the border because of some 
deregulations or reforms that take place early in only one of the two regions.  
If a policy reform takes place in Michigan, and subsequently Michigan grows 
faster than the national average; we are tempted to conclude that the reform has produced 
positive effects. But this may not be a good comparison: When you compare Michigan to 
Texas, it is quite easy for you to find large growth rate differences, either positive or 
negative, simply because the two state economies always move in opposite directions. 
But you can not immediately interpret this as the effect of policy changes in Michigan. 
This paper's solution is to compare the border areas of two neighboring U.S. states 
where policies differ across the state border. In these areas, income level, economic 
structure, etc, are very similar. And more importantly, access to transport, climate, 
agglomeration economy, etc are similar too. These factors are usually very difficult for 
econometricians to explicitly control for; but between two neighboring areas these 
differences are arguably very small. Therefore, the effect of a certain policy change 
should be more precisely identified by comparing the differential outcomes across the 
border.  
In this paper, I use the deregulation of bank geographic expansion in the United 
States as an example to illustrate the application of this methodology. U.S. banking 
market used to be very fragmented. Until the late 1970s, regulations used to restrict a 
bank from setting up branches outside its home county. But in the next two decades, in a 
piecemeal fashion, individual states one after another removed the anti-competition 
restrictions, and these deregulations were supposed to introduce more competition in the 
banking markets and potentially generate faster economic growth.  
One way to verify whether this claim is true or not is to compare the economic 
performance of two neighboring US counties separated by a state border, when bank 
expansion restrictions were already removed on one side of the border but not yet on the 
other side. This study identifies 38 segments of such "regulation change borders," and 
along them 279 pairs of neighboring counties, and thus creates a regression discontinuity 
setting, in which two very similar counties are assigned different treatments simply 
because they are cut off by a political border. If indeed a certain deregulation has positive 
effects, then we should see that in the border areas, a county in the deregulating states 
grows faster than its neighbor on the other side of the border right after the deregulation 
event. 
Using this methodology, this study finds that the state-level deregulations in the 
US produced uneven results: large effects for some states, insignificant for many others, 
and negative for the rest. The study shows that the bank branching deregulations that took 
place before 1985 were in general not followed by faster economic growth. As a matter 
of fact, these earlier liberalizers grew on average 0.12% per year slower compared to 
their neighbors. However, it does not follow that our results have to be inconsistent with 
the Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) study, which finds positive effects on average. We need 
to look into the heterogeneity of the results to make a fair and comprehensive assessment.  
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In contrast to the negative results of the earlier deregulation events, deregulations 
taking place after 1985 were in general associated with positive effects and there were 
five cases (Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Tennessee) in which the intra-
state branching deregulations were followed by statistically significant growth 
accelerations. In all of these five cases, inter-state banking deregulations took place 
before or at least at the same year of the intra-state branching deregulations, and the 
introduction of nationwide potential competitors naturally created stronger effects than 
did most of the statewide branching deregulations in the first half of 1980s that typically 
open the markets to only in-state or regional competitors. 
The US experiences have implications for European banking market integration 
because we can draw comparisons between US states and European countries, and the US 
counties and the regions within a European country. The results of this study would 
suggest that removing barriers that fragment the national banking market within a 
European country can produce greater benefit for the national economy if foreign 
investors and banks do not have any barrier to own and control domestic banks. 
Furthermore, this study finds that the removal of statewide branching restrictions 
had uneven effects on different states, depending on the actual level of competition 
already existing in the local markets before the removal of legal barriers. From the results 
it is noticed that in previously more concentrated (competitive) local markets, 
deregulations were in general associated with larger (smaller) effects. A similar 
difference is found in the comparison of rural versus urban banking markets. The reason 
is quite straightforward: if a local market is already quite competitive although the 
competition arises only from the locals; then the exclusion of competition from outside 
the county is unlikely to be a binding constraint for the local economy and borrowers, and 
the removal of the barriers is unlikely to create much extra benefit either. This is true for 
most urban markets (such as New York and Los Angles) in the US, because in these 
places local competitors are already sufficient for the market to be very contestable. 
In Europe, domestic banking markets are more competitive in some countries 
(regions) than in others, and the introduction of domestic or Europe-wide competition 
could generate uneven benefits across countries and regions. In Germany and Italy for 
example, domestic markets are fragmented for historical and institutional reasons. In such 
markets, the introduction of outside competition could contribute significantly to 
competition. In contrast, such extra benefits could be smaller for metropolitan areas such 
as London or Paris, because the local players alone have already created fierce 
competition among themselves. 
Furthermore, this study finds that the deregulations taking place in the later half of 
the sample generated greater economic benefit than did the earlier deregulations. This is 
consistent with DeLong and DeYoung (2007)'s results that there exists so-called 
"learning-by-observing" in the banking sector consolidation process so that the earlier 
M&As were typically less successful than the later ones. European banks, if they can 
learn by observing the US experiences, could more efficiently exploit the new 
competitive environment enabled by the removal of within-Europe barriers. Therefore, it 
is possible that a level playing field in Europe could create faster, greater, and wider 
benefits for the European economy. 
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1. Introduction 
Liberalization of the banking sector is, in general, shown to have had a positive 
impact on local economic growth (Levine [2004] provides a review of the related 
literature). In the United States, intrastate branching regulations imposed by state 
legislatures used to restrict a bank from making statewide branching expansions, and a 
bank holding company from folding its subsidiaries in different counties into a single 
operation entity. Beginning in the mid-1970s, individual states lifted these restrictions at 
different times in a piecemeal fashion. The staggered nature of the deregulation timings 
has been exploited by researchers to study the effects of banking deregulation on the local 
economy, because the restriction on interstate branching (removed only much later) had 
essentially produced 50 segregated banking systems within the United States, one for 
each state.
3 
Potentially, removal of restrictions on bank entry and expansion could facilitate 
mergers and acquisitions, promote competition, increase bank efficiency, and thus, could 
help local economic growth. For example, Jayaratne and Strahan (1997) find that the 
relaxing of restrictions on bank expansion led to greater efficiency of banks, although 
they find no increase of credit supply. Using state-level data, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) 
provide well-cited evidence that the deregulations were in general associated with faster 
local economic growth. Strahan (2003) provides a good review of the available evidence 
in favor of the positive effects of the deregulations.  
However, we believe that it remains an open empirical question whether 
                                                 
3 For a long period of time in the United States, an otherwise unified nation, banks from other states were 
viewed as “foreign”. Interstate banking regulations used to strictly forbid out-of-state banks from acquiring 
a state’s incumbent banks, let alone opening new in-state branches. Until 1994, even if a state amended its 
law and started to allow interstate banking, newly acquired banking assets could not be folded into the 
acquirer’s banking operations outside the state. 
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regulation of commercial banks’ expansion was a binding constraint on the growth of the 
local economy, and whether removal of this restriction had created immediate and 
significant economic benefits for the local economy. Studies in existing literature tend to 
find a significant positive effect from the deregulation of branching on the local economy, 
but most of them use a state as the unit of analysis. This practice we argue is open to a 
number of econometric problems. Individual states deregulated branching in waves; in 
very few cases (which are the subject of our study) did states in the same region 
deregulate at very different times. To increase the degree of freedom in regressions, 
previous studies typically have had to use very diverse states from different regions to 
form the treatment and the control group; they were forced, for example, to compare 
Texas with Michigan, although the two states are not synchronized in their business 
cycles. After controlling for regional effects, Freeman (2002) and Wall (2004) find that 
the positive effect of banking deregulation on the real economy is not an unambiguous 
result; in some regions they are positive, whereas in many more others, they are actually 
negative. Furthermore, banking deregulation could be induced by an expectation of future 
growth opportunities (unobservable to econometricians), which could create a spurious 
correlation between banking deregulation and future growth accelerations. Therefore, it is 
possible that the episodes of growth accelerations identified by previous studies could be 
the manifestation of heterogeneity of growth paths in different regions (Garrett et al., 
2004), or difference of expected future growth opportunities across states, independent of, 
or not caused by, changes in state-level banking regulations. 
This study uses a novel procedure to establish whether a branching deregulation 
event produces a significantly positive treatment effect or not. The new method compares 
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economic performance of contiguous counties separated only by state borders in cases in 
which one state deregulated intrastate branching earlier than did the other. Because these 
counties are immediately adjacent neighbors, they are expected to be similar in both 
observable, and more importantly, unobservable conditions, and will tend to follow 
similar growth paths in the absence of regulation or policy changes. This study is not the 
first to use this geographic-matching methodology to conduct policy evaluations,
4 but it 
adopts an even more precise method, in that it carefully matches and compares each 
“treated” county with only its own paired neighbor across the border, instead of roughly 
comparing two strips of land on opposite sides of a long border. 
Using a county as a unit of analysis can minimize endogeneity problems. 
Kroszner and Strahan (1999) find that the relative strength of winners (large banks and 
small, bank-dependent firms) and losers (small banks and the rival insurance firms) in 
bank deregulation can explain the timing of branching deregulation across states. In this 
study, however, it is unlikely that economic conditions and the financial sector structure 
in a county can influence regulatory decisions made by the state legislature, which has to 
accommodate the interests of all constituencies, not only a small group of border counties. 
Furthermore, the lack of commuting labor movement across most state borders 
(according to the “Journal to Work” census) ensures that a regulatory shock that affects 
the local economy should translate into perceivable short-term changes in local incomes 
                                                 
4 Fox (1986) finds that sales tax differences between neighboring states affect retail sales in border counties. 
Card and Kruger (1994) look at the New Jersey-Pennsylvania border area to examine the effects of an 
increase in the minimum wage. Black (1999) examines the price of houses located on school-district 
boundaries and finds that parents are willing to pay 2.5% more for a 5% increase in test scores. Using a 
similar methodology, Holmes (1998) finds that as a group, counties on the pro-business side of state 
borders experience faster manufacturing growth. 
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observable to econometricians.
5 Note that New York – New Jersey border is not included 
in our sample. 
Using state-level intrastate branching deregulation events as quasi-experiments, 
this study focuses on how removals of restrictions on statewide branching affect growth 
by comparing growth rate of per capita income on opposite sides of regulation change 
borders, after adjusting for income gap and growth opportunity gap that could potentially 
bias the point estimate of treatment effects. Fictitious placebo deregulations are 
randomized on out-of-sample non-event borders where such dramatic cross-border 
regulatory difference as that seen in regulation change borders did not exist, to 
empirically obtain a statistical table of critical values, which helps us to statistically 
distinguish real treatment effects from the results of potential data-snooping. The same 
method also helps adjust the critical values for spatial correlations of treatment effects 
within a chain of neighboring county-pairs (which could bias the standard errors 
downward).  
Among the 23 events of deregulations taking place during a 15-year period from 
1975 to 1990, this study finds statistically significant growth accelerations after 
deregulation in only five of them, and none of these events took place prior to 1985. The 
new results call for further research on why regulation and deregulation of commercial 
banks’ geographic expansions did not seem to substantially affect the local economy. We 
                                                 
5 This divide, however, does not make the contiguous county economies on opposite sides of state borders 
isolated from each other in the long run. In responding to branching regulations that had been in place since 
the Great Depression, no frictions were great enough to hold off necessary economic adjustment for such a 
long period of time. By the time a deregulation event took place in the 1980s, the two contiguous counties 
were more likely to be in an equilibrium state already, with respect to observable and unobservable local 
factors, including the then prevailing banking regulation arrangements. In the wake of a deregulation shock, 
however, adjustment taking place in the newly deregulated county (presumably toward a higher income 
level than its neighbor if deregulation should have positive effects)  and cross-border growth rate difference 
created by this unilateral adjustment, should be perceivable in the short term (e.g., five years) as the pair 
slowly finds its way to a new equilibrium. 
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provide several plausible explanations.   
The economic impacts of regulation or deregulation of U.S. commercial banks 
could well be overstated. Kane (1996) and Kroszner and Strahan (1999) have pointed out 
the irony that the cost of regulation is usually the lowest by the time it is removed. In the 
history of the U.S. financial service industry, most of the effects targeted by the 
rescission will have already been tolerated by the enforcement system for years before an 
exclusionary statute comes to be formally rescinded, and more importantly, will have 
been from the beginning constantly subject to erosions by market players through legal 
loopholes, contractual and information processing innovations, regulatory/structural 
arbitrage
6, and interpretive changes in statute-implementing regulations that regulatory 
bodies actually enforce. As Kane (1981, p. 359) asserts, “In the 1970s, loophole mining 
and fabrication became the main business of modern depository institutions.” 
Also, the U.S. economy is much less dependent on banks than are continental 
European economies, and thus, burdensome regulations imposed on banks could have but 
limited real effects. Bank lending may not be critical, because other sources of financing 
can easily replace lending by commercial banks (Marquis, 2001). There is already 
empirical evidence suggesting that bank loans have no significant impact on economic 
outputs.
7 Considering the important role already played by nonbank financial institutions 
(which have not been geographically restricted) and capital markets already played vis-à-
vis commercial banks before the deregulation, it is not clear whether commercial banks 
                                                 
6 US Banking Act of 1971 defines a bank as an institution that offeres demand deposits and originate 
commercial and industrial loans. A money market mutual fund is not a bank because it does not originate 
loans, and a finance company is not a bank because it does not accept demand deposits. 
7 Driscoll (2004) uses a panel of state-level data to find that bank loans have small, often negative and 
statistically insignificant, effects on output. Ashcraft (2006) estimates that the elasticity of real state income 
to bank loan supply is close to zero and is definitely no larger than 10%. Ashcraft and Campello (2003) 
show that bank lending is demand-driven and influenced by local economic conditions. 
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provided any credit service to the economy that could not be replaced by nonbank 
financial institutions.
8  Furthermore, post-deregulation consolidations of banks could 
negatively impact smaller and newer firms that are the most dependent on banks.
9  
Below we provide a roadmap for the rest of the paper. Section 2 introduces the 
procedure of identifying regulation change borders and contiguous counties. In Section 3, 
the empirical strategies are introduced. There are several econometric difficulties that 
need to be addressed: First, how should the difference-in-differences treatment effect be 
defined to avoid potentially understating standard errors? Second, how can we correct 
biases in the point estimate of treatment effects? Third, how can we establish correct 
standard errors, and thus, statistical significance of the estimates, through randomization-
type fictitious “placebo deregulation events”? In Sections 4, 5, and 6, the proposed 
strategy is implemented. In Section 4, a statistical table of critical values is empirically 
created through a randomization procedure, also taking into account the influence of 
spatial dependences. In Section 5, the economic effects of each of the 23 events of 
branching deregulations are assessed, based on the critical values. In Section 6, using 
hinterland counties as a second control group, we consider and reject the possibility of 
cross-border spillover of deregulation effects influencing the results. Finally, in Section 7 
                                                 
8 According to Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise (1995), only 20% of nonfarm and nonfinancial corporate debts 
were provided by these commercial banks in 1980; this ratio continued to drop through the 1980s. Finance 
companies, in contrast, facing few geographic expansion restrictions, provided nearly 10% of loans to 
nonfarm and nonfinancial firms. Many finance companies specialize in the factoring of trade account 
receivables, equipment loans, or leases, which are particularly relevant to small businesses that traditionally 
depend on banks. More importantly, a large number of entrepreneurs finance their ventures by taking 
second mortgages on their houses or using the generous limits on their personal credit cards or home equity 
lines of credit. None of these nonbank credit institutions (or products) is geographically restricted by the 
branching regulations. 
9 Berger et al. (2005) provide evidence consistent with the belief that small banks are better able to collect 
and act on soft information than large banks are. In particular, large banks are less willing than small banks 
to lend to those whose credit is "difficult" from the information standpoint, such as firms with no financial 
records. Brickley, Linck, and Smith (2003) also supply evidence that small, locally owned banks have a 
comparative advantage over large banks within specific environments. 
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we discuss several plausible explanations about why regulation and deregulation of 
commercial banks’ geographic expansions, in most cases, appeared not to have 
substantially affected the local economy. In Section 8, we discuss the implications of our 
results for European banking market integration. 
 
2. Matching of Contiguous Counties across Regulation Change Borders 
To assess the real effects of deregulations by comparing the economic 
performance of the treatment group vs. the control group, one first needs to look for pairs 
of neighboring states separated by the so-called regulation change borders. To be 
included in the study, we require that, for a pair of states, and thus their bilateral border, 
bank branching expansions in the second state must remain restricted for at least three 
years after restriction in the first state was removed. These borders are called regulation 
change borders. In the research sample we eventually composed, the average gap 
between the two states’ deregulation timings reaches nearly six years, which we believe 
is sufficiently long for the economic effects of regulatory differences across state borders 
to be observed, if they exist at all.  
2.1. Identifying contiguous Counties 
Thirty-eight segments of such regulation change borders meeting the above 
requirements are identified. Borders of Western states (i.e., Montana, Wyoming, 
Colorado, New Mexico, and all states to the west of them) are excluded from the sample
 
10. These regulation change borders are listed in Table 1 and highlighted in the map in 
                                                 
10 It is much more difficult to identify good match of contiguous counties in the western states. In the 
eastern states, border counties on opposite sides of state borders are typically of fairly uniform width, 
nicely trace out the regulation change borders, forming strips of land on opposite sides of borders. In 
contrast, border counties in the western states are much larger in size, irregular in shape and less densely 
13
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Figure 1. Using these borders, 23 events of state-level branching deregulations 
throughout the United States spanning from the 1970s to the 1980s can be evaluated, 
regarding their impacts on the local economy. These deregulation events include (in 
chronological order): Maine (75), New York (76), New Jersey (77), Virginia (78), Ohio 
(79), Connecticut (80), Alabama (81), Pennsylvania (82), Georgia (83), Massachusetts 
(84), Nebraska (85), Tennessee (85), Mississippi (86), Kansas (87), Michigan (87), North 
Dakota (87), West Virginia (87), Illinois (88), Louisiana (88), Oklahoma (88), Texas (88), 
Missouri (90), and Wisconsin (90).  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
populated. This exclusion requirement does not reduce the sample size significantly, becaue most of the 
western states deregulated bank branching much earlier than the rest of the U.S., and thus, there are few 
cross-border regulatory differences in the west for us to exploit. 
14
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Figure 1:  “Regulation change borders” 
 
 
Note: This study identifies 38 segments of so-called regulation change borders, which are 
highlighted in the map. For at least three years, and on average six years, there were regulatory 
differences across these regulation change borders: banks on side of the borders were relieved 
from restriction on statewide branching; while on the other side, restrictions were eventually 
removed but at least three years later. See Section 2.1 for details. 
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Table 1: Paired states and regulation change borders 
 
Early Deregulator      Late Deregulator 
      
Maine 1975  1987  New  Hampshire 
New York  1976  1980  Connecticut 
New York  1976  1982  Pennsylvania 
New York  1976  1984  Massachusetts 
New Jersey  1977  1982  Pennsylvania 
Virginia  1978  1985  Tennessee 
Virginia  1978  1987  West Virginia 
Virginia  1978  1990  Kentucky 
Ohio 1979  1982  Pennsylvania 
Ohio 1979  1987  Michigan 
Ohio 1979  1987  West  Virginia 
Ohio 1979  1989  Indiana 
Ohio 1979  1990  Kentucky 
Connecticut  1980  1984  Massachusetts 
Alabama 1981  1985  Tennessee 
Alabama 1981  1986  Mississippi 
Alabama 1981  1988  Florida 
Pennsylvania  1982  1987  West Virginia 
Georgia 1983  1988  Florida 
Massachusetts  1984  1987  New Hampshire 
Nebraska 1985  1990  Missouri 
Nebraska 1985  1994  Iowa 
Tennessee  1985  1990  Kentucky 
Tennessee  1985  1990  Missouri 
Tennessee  1985  1994  Arkansas 
Mississippi 1986  1994  Arkansas 
Kansas  1987  1990  Missouri 
Michigan 1987  1990  Wisconsin 
North Dakota  1987  1993  Minnesota 
West Virginia  1987  1990  Kentucky 
Illinois  1988  1994  Iowa 
Louisiana 1988  1994  Arkansas 
Oklahoma  1988  1994  Arkansas 
Texas 1988  1994  Arkansas 
Missouri  1990  1994  Arkansas 
Missouri  1990  1994  Iowa 
Wisconsin 1990  1993  Minnesota 
Wisconsin 1990  1994  Iowa 
 
Note: Pairs of states that bilaterally form the 38 segments of regulation change borders are listed 
in the table, sorted by the year when the first state in each pair removed restrictions on statewide 
branching. The year when each state removed restrictions on statewide branching is also indicated 
in the table (original source: Amel, 1993).  
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One then needs to match pairs of contiguous counties across these so-called 
regulation change borders. The National Atlas of the United States 
(http://www.nationalatlas.gov/) was used to identify 285 pairs of contiguous counties. 
The list of the county-pairs is available from the author upon request. In the study, the 
counties located in states that deregulated earlier than their neighbors will form the 
treatment group, while those located in states where restrictions were removed at least 
three years later will form the control group. About one third of the sample counties are 
located in metropolitan areas. 
It has been a convention in the literature to use a county as the unit of local 
banking market (e.g., Berger, Demsetz, & Strahan, 1999; Black & Strahan, 2002; Prager 
& Hannan, 1998; and Rhoades, 2000). Many researchers have used a county as the unit 
of the local economy to study the effect of bank activities on economic outputs
11 (e.g., 
Ashcraft, 2005; Calomiris & Mason, 2003; Clair et al., 1994; and Gilbert & Kochin, 
1989). In the Federal Reserve’s definition of local banking markets (DiSalvo, 1999), 
which takes into account commuting patterns as well as other factors, a rural county is 
typically also a local banking market. 
2.2. Contiguous counties are similar in observable characteristics 
The geographic matching produces higher homogeneity between the treatment 
and control groups, and can potentially reduce background noises and standard errors 
when we estimate treatment effects, and thus, can increase the power of the tests. 
Contiguous counties are arguably similar in many unobservable factors, but it is difficult 
for econometricians to formally verify it (otherwise, they are observable in the first place).  
                                                 
11 because Forni and Reichlin (1997) show that, in the United States, county-specific components of output 
fluctuations are 1.35 times greater than state-specific components. 
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Nevertheless, here we can still analyze some observable characteristics.   
To give readers a better understanding of how geographic matching has improved 
from previous studies in identifying the control group at least in observable 
characteristics, we conduct a counterfactual experiment: In the year before deregulation, 
we calculate each deregulated (treated) county’s average absolute difference (in terms of 
income per capita and manufacturing income share, respectively) from all counties 
nationwide that deregulated at least three years later. This alternative way of forming the 
control group is equivalent to the practices of Jayarante and Strahan (1996) and other 
typical studies in the literature, which obtain point estimate of treatment effect by 
comparing at certain points in time deregulated states with all other states nationwide that 
had yet to deregulate. For a specific deregulation event, the numbers tell us if counties in 
the control group are drawn nationwide from states that deregulated at least three years 
later, what the average absolute difference will be between the treatment group and 
control group counties, in terms of income per capita and manufacturing share, 
respectively. 
In Table 2, the average differences between treatment and control group, achieved 
through the two different approaches of control-group sampling are compared based on 
income per capita and manufacturing income share, respectively, and reported by 
individual deregulation event. It is clear that in most deregulation events, geographic 
matching has produced a much smaller absolute difference between treatment and control 
groups, in these two observed characteristics, than what can be achieved in pooled 
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Table 2: How does the use of contiguous counties help reduce observable 
differences between treatment and control groups? 
 
 
Absolute log difference (%) 
in income per capita 
Absolute difference in 
manufacturing income ratio 














        
Alabama 15.33  23.70  0.17  0.21 
Connecticut 15.66 35.24  0.07  0.20 
Georgia 16.23  24.26  0.22  0.20 
Illinois 8.36  18.56  0.18  0.16 
Kansas 12.91  21.56  0.07  0.14 
Louisiana 16.32  24.86  0.14  0.15 
Maine 10.56  19.01  0.15  0.20 
Massachusetts 7.86  37.86  0.08  0.21 
Michigan 10.54  18.36  0.11  0.14 
Mississippi 11.73 35.20  0.08  0.14 
Missouri 13.07  25.86  0.17  0.16 
Nebraska 12.11  21.65  0.08  0.15 
New Jersey  6.36  31.18  0.10  0.19 
New York  12.28  22.90  0.14  0.20 
North Dakota  11.76  24.58  0.12  0.14 
Ohio 12.18  21.26  0.15  0.21 
Oklahoma 21.13  28.15  0.16  0.16 
Pennsylvania 6.61  18.64  0.19  0.18 
Tennessee 14.16  26.38  0.14  0.21 
Texas 14.89  14.35  0.31  0.12 
Virginia 19.20  22.29  0.14  0.19 
West Virginia  14.71  23.47  0.08  0.15 
Wisconsin 10.28  15.88  0.12  0.13 
        
Total 13.45  23.44  0.14  0.18 
  
Note: To give readers a sense of how geographic matching has improved on previous studies in identifying a 
better matched control group at least in some observable characteristics, we conduct a counterfactual experiment. 
For each deregulated (treated) county, at the time of deregulation, we also calculate its average differences (in 
terms of income per capita and manufacturing income ratio, respectively) from all counties nationwide that 
deregulated at least three years later. This alternative way of forming the control group is equivalent to the 
practice of Jayarante and Strahan (1996) and other typical studies in the literature, which produce point estimate 
of treatment effects by comparing at certain points in time deregulated states with all other states nationwide that 
had yet to deregulate. The numbers can tell us, for a specific treatment county, if its controls are drawn 
nationwide from states that deregulated at least three years later, as opposed to from contiguous counties, what 
will be the average differences between treatment group and control group counties, in terms of the two 
observable characteristics. In the Table, averaged by deregulation event, we present and compare the observed 
absolute differences between treatment and control group, achieved through the two different approaches of 
control-group sampling. It is clear that in almost all cases, geographic matching produces smaller absolute 
difference between treatment and control groups than what can be achieved in pooled regressions a la Jayarante 
and Strahan (1996).  See Section 2.2 for details. 
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Certainly, if we scan the whole national sample, consider also counties that are 
not necessarily contiguous to the treatment counties, and retain only the best matched 
counties in these two observable characteristics (per capita income and manufacturing 
income share); we could form an even better matched control group. The reason for not 
doing so is that observable differences can be easily controlled for, do not pose a large 
challenge to econometricians, and thus, is not a major problem in this study. On the 
contrary, unobservable characteristics, in which contiguous counties are less likely to 
differ from each other, are what usually trouble econometricians because there is no way 
econometricians can explicitly adjust for unobservable growth opportunities, otherwise 
they are observable in the first place. Furthermore, there are many factors that are 
observable but difficult to exhaust, quantify, or control for, e.g., climate, access to 
transport, and agglomeration economy. However, these factors are less likely to differ or 
matter within a pair of contiguous counties. Therefore, the strategy adopted in the study, 
which takes into account such a tradeoff, is to use contiguous counties to minimize the 
difference in unobservable factors, and then explicitly adjust for the remaining observable 
differences, which is less difficult for econometricians.  
2.3. Hinterland counties 
A second control group of paired counties is also identified, which we name 
hinterland counties. They are located on the same side of the regulated counties, and 
therefore were also kept regulated longer than the deregulated counties on the opposite 
side of state borders. The hinterland counties, however, are farther away from the 
regulation change borders, and are not directly contiguous with the deregulated counties. 
Nevertheless, they remain contiguous to the border regulated counties on the same side of 
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the border. In other words, hinterland counties are co-contiguous with the deregulated 
counties, with the border deregulated counties located in-between them. We identify 249 
such hinterland counties. The list is available from the author upon request. For some 
deregulated counties, proper hinterland counties cannot be found for geographic 
reasons.
12  In the study, the hinterland counties are used as a second control group to 
consider potential spillovers of deregulation effects across state borders, which could 
disqualify border counties as valid controls in the event of treatment. The rationale of this 
robustness check will be explained in detail in Section 6.  
To help readers better understand the geographic terms we mention above, Figure 
2 provides a graphical example: Georgia lifted the branching regulation in 1983, whereas 
Florida remained regulated until five years later in 1988. In this case, Brooks County in 
Georgia is a deregulated county; Madison County in Florida is a regulated county; and 
Taylor County farther within Florida is a hinterland county.  
 
                                                 
12 There are several reasons why hinterland counties cannot be found for some county-pairs. One of the 
simple reasons is that the hinterland is the Gulf of Mexico. Another common reason is that the candidate 
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Note: This is a map of the area around the Georgia-Florida border. Georgia removed restrictions 
on statewide branching in 1983, whereas Florida removed them in 1988. Thus, there were 
regulatory differences across the Georgia-Florida border during the 1983-1988 period. An 
example is given in the map: Brooks county in Georgia is the so-called deregulated county, 
Madison county in Florida is the so-called regulated county, and Taylor county also in Florida is 
the so-called hinterland county. See Section 2 for details. 
 
3. Methodology: Estimating the Treatment Effects  
3.1. Collapsing of information into “pre-” and “post-” period 
A difference-in-differences methodology compares outcomes in the treatment 
group and the control group, in the “pre-” and “post-” treatment periods to identify the 
treatment effects.  This study defines the two periods as follows:  
(1) “Pre-” Period:  In this period, both states restricted intrastate branching. The 
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states first removed the restrictions. Thus, there were no treatments during this 
period. For states that deregulated before 1979, this period is shorter than ten 
years, as county-level income growth data are available only from 1969. 
(2) “Post-” Period: In this period, one of the two states was deregulated, but the 
other state remained regulated until much later. In this period, there were 
regulatory differences across state borders, and thus, one state received 
treatment while the other did not. When Iowa is used in the comparisons as 
the regulated state, we end the “post-” period in 1994.
13  
To estimate the economic effect of deregulation, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) use 
a panel data set pooling yearly time-series information. However, Bertrand, Duflo, and 
Mullainathan (2004), show that difference-in-differences estimation that uses many years 
of data and focuses on serially correlated outcomes does not produce consistent standard 
errors. Bertrand et al find an effect significant at the 5% level for up to 45% of the 
placebo treatments, which clearly rejects the validity of the standard errors.  Furthermore, 
Bertrand et al do not find econometric corrections that place a specific parametric form 
on the time-series process to be able to correct the problem. Nevertheless, they do show 
that collapsing the time series information into a “pre-” and “post-” period works well.  
As a basic but first and necessary step to avoid potentially inflating the statistical 
significance of the treatment effects, we follow exactly this prescription and study a 
treatment effect that is defined as difference-in-differences of average annual growth 
rates (%) between the “pre-” and “post-” periods, and between treatment and control 
                                                 
13 Iowa eventually removed statewide branching restrictions completely in 2001. We end the comparison in 
1994 when the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) was passed because 
by then, all of the other states had already permitted intrastate branching, and the year is generally regarded 
as the completion date of geographic banking deregulations in the United States. 
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counties on opposite sides of regulation change borders. The treatment effect (TE), i.e., 
“growth acceleration gap” between two contiguous counties, is thus measured by: 
    ( ) ( ) pre post pre post g g g g TE , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 − − − =                                          (1) 
where g1 (g0) is the average annual growth rate of real per capita income in the county 
that removed branching restrictions earlier (later), while subscripts “pre-” and “post-” 
denote the “pre-” and “post-” periods,  respectively. Per capita personal income data at 
county level were obtained from the Regional Economic Information System (REIS) of 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Real growth rates are obtained by deflating the 
nominal income data with the national consumer price index obtained from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS).  
The hypothesis of the study is: If a certain bank branching deregulation has any 
positive effect on the local economy, one should observe that deregulated counties 
experience a greater growth acceleration in the several years after the deregulation 
compared to their neighbors across the regulation change borders, or in other words, we 
should find the treatment effect (i.e., the growth acceleration gap) to be significantly 
positive, both economically and statistically.  
There are two steps we need to go through before we can establish whether 
growth acceleration actually takes place after a specific event of deregulation. First, we 
need to correct bias in the point estimate of treatment effect. Second, we need to know 
the estimation procedure’s correct standard errors in order to establish statistical 
significance of the treatment effects. The second step is the most important and 
challenging part of the exercise.  But let’s start from the easier one first.  
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3.2. Correcting bias in the point estimate of treatment effects (TE) 
To correct bias in the point estimate of treatment effects, we need to control for 
factors that could be correlated with both the deregulation event and future growth. These 
factors could be observable or unobservable, time-invariant or time-varying.  
The use of contiguous counties has helped us minimize the influence of 
unobservable (to econometricians) factors, because contiguous counties are arguably 
similar in a lot of unobservable factors, although it is difficult for econometricians to 
verify it formally--otherwise they are observable in the first place.   
Furthermore, any observable or unobservable factors that affect growth, if they 
are time-invariant, should not bias the point estimate of the difference-in-differences 
treatment effects; because in the treatment effect’s definition 
( ) ( ) pre post pre post g g g g TE , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 − − − = , if a certain time-invariant, county-specific factor 
affects growth, it should have affected g1, pre (g0, pre) as much as it had affected g1, post (g0, 
post) , and should have been canceled out already.  
Therefore, what remain for us to adjust are those factors that are both observable 
and likely to be time-varying: We control for two most obvious factors that are likely to 
affect growth. Below, we will first discuss how they affect growth in general, and then 
elaborate on the details on how the time-varying components can be incorporated in the 
estimation of treatment effects.  
The first one is income gap, which affects growth difference through the 
convergence effect. It is defined as the log difference (%) between two counties’ per 
capita income. If a county that deregulates earlier is poorer compared to its neighbors at 
the beginning of a period, then it tends to grow faster in the next years, even absent of 
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any deregulation effects. Not taking into account this factor would lead us to overestimate 
the treatment effects. Nevertheless, income gap at the start of the “post-” period alone 
does not matter to the treatment effects, because if the income gap is as large as it was 10 
years before deregulation (i.e., the beginning of the “pre-” period), then the convergence 
effect would be the same for both periods and should have been canceled out in the 
difference-in-differences estimate. If the gap has changed during the 10-year period, 
however, the effect needs to be explicitly controlled for. Thus, the first factor we control 
for is the change in income gap 10 years before and at the time of the deregulation.  
The second important factor that affects growth difference is the growth 
opportunity gap, which is determined by sector-specific shocks at the regional level 
(Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1992). Sector-specific shocks at the regional level, i.e., regional 
sectoral growth pattern, affect local growth differentially depending on the local 
industrial structure. If in a certain region manufacturing grows slower than non-
manufacturing over a period, then a county with less manufacturing share than its 
neighbors at the beginning of the period tends to grow faster subsequently, even absent of 
deregulation events.  Not taking into account this factor would lead us to overestimate the 
treatment effects.  
Within a county-pair, the growth opportunity gap between two counties over a 
certain period is defined as the difference in manufacturing income share between the 
two counties at the beginning of the period, multiplied by regional-level growth rate 
difference between the manufacturing sector and the non-manufacturing sector, i.e.,  
) )( ( _ _ 0 1 S M G G M M Gap y Opportunit Growth − − =                                 (2) 
where M1 is the manufacturing share (ratio) of county 1, and M0 that of county 0; GM is 
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the annual growth rate (%) of manufacturing in the region, and GS that of non-
manufacturing in the region.  The derivation of the formula is explained in the footnote.
 14  
Sectoral growth data are obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)’s 
database. The regional growth rate is defined as the average of the two-state economies in 
question, and thus, growth opportunity gaps differ for every county-pair. Again, this 
factor does not matter if (a) industrial structures remain the same 10 years before and at 
the time of the deregulation; and (b) regional growth patterns are the same in the two 
periods. What we need to control for, instead, is the change (difference) in growth 
opportunity gap between the “post-” and “pre-” periods, as time-invariant components are 
already mechanically removed from the difference-in-differences treatment effects. 
3.3. Establishing correct standard errors of the estimation procedure  
The relatively more difficult part of the exercise is to establish the correct 
standard error of a treatment effect, or in other words, to find out how large a treatment 
effect needs to be to qualify as statistically significant growth acceleration. This is a 
challenging task. OLS standard errors obtained from the in-sample could be biased 
downward, because neither the research question we study nor the research sample we 
select are randomly drawn from the population of ideas; or in other words, (purposeful or 
collective) data snooping could have been practiced to obtain the significant results. As a 
matter of fact, when we decide to study one particular type of policy change in this paper, 
i.e., branching deregulations, as opposed to many other numerous potential candidates, 
                                                 
14 The predicted growth rate of county 1, based on region-wide sectoral-specific shock and local industrial 
structure,   is s M G M G M ) 1 ( 1 1 − + , and that for county 0 is  s M G M G M ) 1 ( 0 0 − + .  The “growth 
opportunity gap” between county 1 and county 0, thus, is the difference between the two predicted rates: 
[] [ ]
) )( (
) 1 ( ) 1 (
0 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 1
S M s M S M
s M s M
G G M M G M G M G M G M
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we already make a non-random choice potentially guilty of data-snooping. This problem 
is particularly severe here because the outcome variable, income growth of US county 
economies, is widely studied, and the possibility of collective data-snooping cannot be 
easily ruled out. The presence of spatial correlation within a chain of neighboring county-
pairs along the same segment of a border further exacerbate the problem because a 
positive correlation of shocks and treatment effects within a border county chain greatly 
increases the chance of finding large mean of the treatment effects in a data-mining 
process.  Furthermore, the United States is a collection of diverse regional economies 
with heterogeneous levels and variance of growth rates, and the branching deregulation 
events spanned a 15-year period of unprecedented and volatile changes in the banking 
sector and in the economy. These factors greatly increase the probability of finding large 
treatment effects through data-mining.   
To address the above concerns, we adopt a non-parametric strategy that is used 
rather routinely in clinical trial studies to establish statistical significance, usually known 
as randomization (or permutation) test. To implement this method, we will utilize 
information from the out-of-sample “non-event borders.” Other than the 38 segments of 
regulation change borders used to obtain treatment effects of actual deregulation events, 
we further identify 32 segments of “non-event borders” (and 266 pairs of contiguous 
counties), where there are no such dramatic cross-border policy differences as those 
observed in the “regulation change borders” (i.e., counties on one side of the border 
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treatments on these non-event borders and calculate the “treatment effects” for these 
placebo events based on actual growth rates outcomes as if real deregulations had 
actually taken place. As a result of these simulations, we are able to obtain an empirical 
distribution of the “treatment effects when there are no treatments”, by exhausting all of 
the possible fictitious scenarios. Each placebo deregulation is specified as a different 
combination of the following three parameters: (a) any one county-pair from the non-
event borders, (b) any one year for the deregulation to take place; and (c) either side of 
the border to receive the deregulation earlier (i.e., which side will be assigned to 
treatment group and the other to control group). Therefore, the universe of the placebo 
deregulations can be known by exhausting all of the possible combinations.  
Note that, in our preferred procedure (see Section 4.4 for details), to remove the 
influence of positive spatial correlation of treatment effects within a chain of neighboring 
county-pairs, in constructing a scenario, instead of a single county-pair we choose to 
draw a chain of certain number of neighboring county-pairs from a border, and 
administer the placebo deregulation to all counties on one side of the border chain. Then, 
the mean treatment effects of these neighboring county-pairs is calculated and retained to 
form an empirical distribution that has by construction taken into account the spatial 
correlations of treatment effects among neighboring county-pairs. 
Because the placebo deregulations are completely fictitious, the distribution of 
their “treatment effects” can inform us intuitively: by certain percentage of chance how 
large (extreme) a treatment effect can be obtained by examining a county-pair randomly 
drawn from borders where no real treatments are applied in reality. Let’s assume the 95
th 
percentile of the distribution is a treatment effect of +2% per year, and you, a researcher 
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We then randomize (also known as “permutate”) fictitious placebo deregulation  
of the data set, are given 20 draws from the universe of possibilities in designing a study 
and producing an empirical result. Then simply by a five-percentage chance, you could 
find growth acceleration of such magnitude in 1 of the 20 draws. Similarly, if 20 
researchers are mining the same dataset, one of them could by chance identify significant 
growth accelerations of such magnitude, although no real treatments are actually applied.  
In this case, only when the treatment effect of an actual event is greater than +2% can you 
firmly acquit the result of data-snooping charge and establish the statistical significance 
at the 95% level. 
Based on the empirical distribution of treatment effects derived from the 
randomized simulations, a statistical table of critical values at various confidence levels 
can be created.  Treatment effects estimated from actual deregulation events then can be 
compared against the corresponding critical values, and exact statistical significance can 
be established. This statistical table will be useful not only for this particular study, but 
for future studies that utilize the same empirical setup to examine the economic impacts 
of many other financial regulations that used to exhibit cross-state differences at certain 
points in time, which may include personal bankruptcy law, foreclosure law (judicial vs. 
power-of-sale), predatory lending law (modern version of usury law), depositor 
preference law, and anti-takeover law, to name just a few obvious subjects of interest to 
financial economists. 
3.4. Using the non-event sample to correct biases in the point estimate of actual 
treatment effects 
The non-event borders sample also helps correcting bias in the point estimate of 
treatment effect. In Section 3.2, we have established that income gap and growth 
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opportunity gap can affect growth rate difference, and they need to be controlled for to 
correct bias in the point estimate of treatment effects. To do this, we will need to run a 
regression of the raw treatment effects against changes in income gap and growth 
opportunity gap, and then the residuals of the regression are retained as the adjusted 
treatment effects. This, however, is yet to be an unbiased point estimate, unless it is 
estimated on the non-event border sample where deregulations did not actually happen.  
The reason is that when one runs such a regression on the sample where deregulation 
actually took place, what one is studying is not how income gap normally affects growth, 
i.e., whether lower-income counties should grow faster than higher-income counties 
holding other factors constant. Instead, the coefficient on the income gap will reflect 
whether deregulations help lower-income deregulated counties more than they help 
higher-income deregulated counties, conditional on deregulations having taken place and 
having produced positive effects.  Such an interaction effect between the actual 
occurrence of deregulation event and initial income gap is implicitly installed in the 
regression model by the sample-selection itself, if the model is estimated on the in-
sample, i.e., where deregulations actually happened.  
Our solution to this problem is to conduct a “dry run” on the out-of-sample non-
event borders to obtain the coefficients that truly capture how changes in income gap and 
growth opportunity gap unconditionally predict treatment effects.  The regression is 
specified as follows (see Section 3.2 for definitions):  
Raw Treatment Effect = β1×Change in income gap + β2×Change in growth 
opportunity gap + ε                                                                                              (3)                  
Then we will apply the fitted coefficients of Eq. (3) to the actual regulation 
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change borders to correct bias in raw treatment effects. The formula is specified as 
follows, where  1 β  and  2 β  are the two fitted coefficients obtained from the regression 
specified in Eq. (3):  
Adjusted Treatment Effect = Raw Treatment Effects −  1 β ×Change in income gap 
−  2 β  ×Change in growth opportunity gap                                                             (4) 
 
4. Randomizing Placebo Deregulations on the Non-Event Borders 
In this section, we will implement the empirical strategies introduced in the 
Section 3. Before working on the regulation change borders and assessing the actual 
deregulation events, we first need to conduct randomized simulations on the non-event 
borders to obtain empirical distribution of the treatment effect estimator, as well as the 
coefficients of Eq.(3), which will be used to  correct bias in point estimates.  
4.1. Conducting simulations and obtaining estimates of “treatment effects” 
In the eastern United States (i.e., states to the west of Montana, Wyoming, 
Colorado, and New Mexico), there are 60 segments of bilateral state borders that can 
potentially be utilized for the study, of which 38 are so-called regulation change borders 
according to our definition (i.e., one side of the border deregulated branching earlier, 
while the other side had not followed within three years). These regulation change 
borders will be used to assess the real effects of actual deregulation events. The 
remaining 32 segments of borders are defined as the non-event borders, where such 
dramatic events as those observed in the regulation change borders did not take place. In 
Figure 3, the 32 segments of non-event borders are highlighted in the map, and in Table 3, 
the states forming the bilateral borders are listed. Along these non-event borders, 266 
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pairs of contiguous counties are identified.    
Table 3: Non-event states used for simulations 
 
State name  Number of 
county-pairs 
Share in the 
sample (%) 
Alabama 17  3.20 
Connecticut 3  0.56 
Delaware 11  2.07 
Georgia 41  7.71 
Illinois 40  7.52 
Indiana 38  7.14 
Iowa 14  2.63 
Kentucky 27  5.08 
Louisiana 23  4.32 
Maryland 30  5.64 
Massachusetts 7  1.32 
Michigan 5  0.94 
Minnesota 18  3.38 
Mississippi 18 3.38 
Missouri 19  3.57 
New Hampshire  5  0.94 
New Jersey  7  1.32 
New York  12  2.26 
North Carolina  50  9.40 
Oklahoma 2 0.38 
Pennsylvania 13  2.44 
Rhode Island  8  1.50 
South Carolina  31  5.83 
South Dakota  10  1.88 
Tennessee 23  4.32 
Texas 11  2.07 
Vermont 13  2.44 
Virginia 20  3.76 
West Virginia  9  1.69 
Wisconsin 7 1.32 
Total 532  100 
 
Note: Thirty-two segments of so-called non-event borders are identified for the study. Placebo 
deregulations are randomly applied to these borders to obtain fictitious treatment effects. Placebo 
deregulations can be scheduled to take place earlier on either side of the border. Thirty states are 
eligible to receive placebo deregulation shock earlier than their neighboring states, and thus, form 
the treatment group (similarly, in separate scenarios they can be scheduled to receive the 
treatments later than their neighbors, and thus, form the control group, too.) The names of the 
states are listed in the table. The second column records the number of county-pairs that can be 
studied if the corresponding state is slated for an earlier placebo deregulation. Note that the 
numbers add up to twice the number of county-pairs along the non-event borders, because the 
deregulations can take place earlier in either side of the border, or in other words, a state can 
belong to both treatment and control groups in separate scenarios. 
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Figure 3:  “Non-event borders” 
 
 
Note: This study identifies 32 segments of so-called non-event borders, which are highlighted in 
the map below. Across the so-called regulation change borders, for at least three years there were 
regulatory differences, with commercial banks on only one side of the borders free from 
restriction on statewide branching. Across these non-event borders, however, there were no such 
dramatic situations. In the study, fictitious placebo deregulation events are randomly simulated on 
these borders where treatments do not exist in reality, to obtain an empirical distribution of the 
fictitious events’ “treatment effects,” which later can help us distinguish real treatment effects of 
actual deregulation events from the potential results of data-snooping. The critical values of the 
distribution at various confidence levels can tell us how easily we can obtain certain large 
treatment effects through data-snooping on borders where real treatments do not occur in reality. 
See Section 3 and Section 4 for details. 
 
 
We will simulate fictitious placebo deregulations on these borders to find out 
what magnitude of “treatment effects” we could obtain through data snooping, on these 
borders where differential treatments are not real. This can help us create a benchmark to 
statistically distinguish real deregulation effects from what can be obtained by data-
34
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 788
July 2007 
snooping. In constructing a placebo deregulation, we can randomly draw a county-pair 
from these borders, choose the year for the placebo deregulation, and apply it earlier to 
one side of the border than the other. And then we will calculate “treatment effect” of this 
placebo deregulation, using actual realized growth rate data. As a result, we are able to 
form an empirical distribution of the “treatment effects when treatments are not real” by 
exhausting all of the possible fictitious scenarios. A placebo deregulation can be 
produced from the random combination of the following three parameters: (a) any one of 
the 266 county-pairs; (b) any 1 of the 11 years (1979-1989)
15; and (c) either side of the 
border (for the deregulation to take place earlier). Therefore the total number of all 
possible combinations is 5,852 (i.e., 266 × 11 × 2).  
The schedules of placebo deregulations are standardized so that the “post-” period 
lasts for five years, i.e., there is a five-year waiting period before the second state also 
deregulates branching.  This is representative of the actual deregulation schedule in our 
real sample, in which the median gap is exactly five years. The length of the “post-” 
period is also similar to that in Jayaratne and Strahan’s (1996) sample, which makes the 
point estimates somewhat comparable across studies, although they use a state as the unit 
of analysis.  
4.2. Adjusting for the income gap and the growth opportunity gap 
As discussed in Section 3.2, income gap and growth opportunity gap between 
treatment and control group, if not controlled for, would bias the point estimate of 
treatment effects. Thus, after each simulation, we calculate not only the raw treatment 
effects, but also the changes in income gap and growth opportunity gap between the “pre-
                                                 
15 The “pre-” period is ten years long, and county-level income data are available only after 1969; thus, the 
placebo deregulation can only take place in or after 1979. Similarly, as the sample period ends at 1994, the 
last year possible for a placebo deregulation with a five-year “post-” period has to be 1989. 
35
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 788
July 2007 
” and “post-” periods.  Then we pool together the information of all of the 5,852 
simulations, and estimate an OLS regression of the raw treatment effects against changes 
in income gap and growth opportunity gap, as specified in equation (3). The residuals of 
the regression are then retained as the adjusted treatment effects.  
The regression results are reported as follows, with the estimation standard errors 
of the coefficients indicated within parentheses.
 16 
Raw Treatment Effect = −0.1294 (0.0019) × Change in income gap + 0.3816 
(0.0559) × Change in growth opportunity gap            (adjusted R
2=0.45)                (5) 
Note that the standard errors of these OLS coefficients are clearly under-estimated, 
because a county is used in separate scenarios for many times, and thus, included for 
multiple times in the regression sample. We do not attempt to correct the standard errors, 
as only the point estimates of the coefficients, which are not contaminated, will be used 
in this paper.                                                                                                                         
The negative coefficient on income gap confirms that if the income gap between 
two contiguous counties widens (assuming that the deregulated county is initially poorer) 
during the 10-year period before the deregulation happens, then the raw treatment effect 
will be biased upward because the convergence effect becomes greater and the 
deregulated counties will naturally tend to speed up. Without adjusting for this factor, we 
could identify a positive treatment effect for the deregulated county, even when the 
placebo deregulation has no effects.  
                                                 
16 By construction of the simulations, i.e., a county is used as both treatment and control groups (in separate 
simulation scenarios), the coefficient on the constant of the regression will always be zero when it is 
estimated based on the population of all 5,582  possible scenarios. For the same reason, both of the two 
control variables, change in income gap and change in growth opportunity gap, have zero as their means.  
The standard deviation of “change in income gap” is 10.8%, while that for “change in growth opportunity 
gap” is 0.366. 
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The positive coefficient on growth opportunity gap confirms that change in either 
local industrial structure or regional growth pattern/trend has important impacts on future 
growth.  If county A has a lower manufacturing share than its neighbor’s, and this 
remains unchanged 10 years before and at the time of deregulation, but regional 
manufacturing grows slower than non-manufacturing in the “post-” period than in the 
“pre-” period, then county A will naturally tend to grow faster even in the absence of a 
deregulation. Similarly, if the regional growth pattern remains unchanged in the “pre-” 
and “post-” periods (and manufacturing grows slower than non-manufacturing), but 
county A’s manufacturing share drops even further during the 10-year pre-period; then 
subsequently after deregulation, county A will naturally accelerate further even absent of 
the deregulation effect, as its growth opportunity is getting better.  
4.3. Creating the statistical table of critical values for the treatment effect estimator 
The residuals obtained from regression (5) are used as the adjusted treatment 
effects of the placebo deregulation events. Each residual value is linked to an individual 
placebo treatment. In Figure 4, the whole distribution of the residuals is presented in a 
histogram. As the placebo deregulations are completely fictitious, the reference 
distribution can tell us, in the absence of real treatments, how easily we will encounter a 
certain large (extreme) treatment effects when there are actually no treatments at all. Note 
that by construction (that a placebo deregulation could occur earlier in both side of the 
border, in separate simulation scenarios), the two-tails distribution of the fictitious 
treatment effects obtained from the population of placebo simulations is always 
symmetrical with zero as the mean. 
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Figure 4:  Empirical distribution of fictitious treatment effects obtained 
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Note: In the study, fictitious placebo deregulations are randomized on the non-event borders, and 
then adjusted treatment effect is calculated based on actual growth realization data, for each of the 
5,852 fictitious deregulation events. The distribution of the fictitious treatment effects is 
presented in the form of a histogram. Because the placebo deregulations are completely fictitious, 
the distribution depicted here can reveal, by a certain percentage of chance, how large a fictitious 
treatment effect can be obtained by randomly selecting a county-pair from the non-event borders 
and calculating the treatment effect based on actual growth rates data as if the treatment were real. 
See Section 4.3 for details. The bin size of the histogram is 0.5%.  
 
The distribution in Figure 4 tells us that when studying a non-event border along 
which there is only one county-pair, there is a 10% random chance that we could find 
treatment effects (growth acceleration) greater than 1.82%, even in the absence of any 
actual occurrence of treatments on one side of the border. This means that when 
evaluating an actual deregulation event, if there is only one county-pair along the 
regulation change border, and the point estimate of the treatment effect is 1.81%, we still 
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cannot establish at 90% confidence level that statistically significant growth acceleration 
actually occurs in this particular deregulation event, because even in the non-event 
borders where there are no real treatments, there is more than a 10% chance we can 
randomly run into treatment effects of such a magnitude.  In Table 4, a table of critical 
values for various confidence levels is created based on the empirical distribution of 
fictitious treatment effects. According to the empirical distribution, when the treatment 
effect is estimated based on a single county-pair, the critical value of treatment effects for 
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Table 4: Statistical table of critical values for the mean treatment effects 
(not yet adjusted for spatial correlations) 
 












1 1.82 2.45 4.20 
2 1.28 1.73 2.97 
3 1.05 1.42 2.42 
4 0.91 1.23 2.10 
5 0.81 1.10 1.88 
6 0.74 1.00 1.71 
7 0.69 0.93 1.59 
8 0.64 0.87 1.48 
9 0.61 0.82 1.40 
10 0.57 0.78 1.33 
11 0.55 0.74 1.26 
12 0.52 0.71 1.21 
13 0.50 0.68 1.16 
14 0.49 0.66 1.12 
15 0.47 0.63 1.08 
16 0.45 0.61 1.05 
17 0.44 0.59 1.02 
18 0.43 0.58 0.99 
19 0.42 0.56 0.96 
20 0.41 0.55 0.94 
25 0.36 0.49 0.84 
30 0.33 0.45 0.77 
35 0.31 0.41 0.71 
40 0.29 0.39 0.66 
45 0.27 0.37 0.63 
50 0.26 0.35 0.59 
 
Note: Along the 32 segments of non-event borders, randomized simulations let fictitious placebo 
deregulations take place on any of the 266 pairs of contiguous border counties, in any one year 
between 1979 and 1989. Once the state to be scheduled for an earlier placebo deregulation is 
selected (either side of the border can be selected), counties on the other side of the state border 
will be scheduled to deregulate five years later. Then, the raw treatment effects will be calculated 
based on the difference-in-differences of average annual growth rate between “post-” and “pre-” 
period and between the two contiguous counties. The “adjusted treatment effect” is then obtained 
by taking the residuals from a regression of raw treatment effect on change in income gap and 
growth opportunity gap between the “post-” and “pre-” period.  
An empirical distribution of the placebo deregulations’ treatment effects is obtained based on all 
5,852 possible scenarios. As the placebo deregulations are completely fictitious, the distribution 
can inform us: by a certain percentage of chance how large a “treatment effect” we could obtain 
by randomly selecting a county-pair from borders where cross-border differential treatments did 
not occur in reality.  In actual events of deregulations, along a border there are multiple pairs of 
contiguous counties. Assuming no spatial correlations of treatment effects within a chain of 
neighboring county-pairs along the same segment of a border, the critical values for the mean 
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treatment effects can be extrapolated from the single county-pair case by the formula: 
KN=K1/SQRT(N), where N is the number of county-pairs used to form the mean, and K is the 
critical value. To save space, for N> 20, critical values are reported in the table only for the 
multiples of 5s. 
Let’s take an actual deregulation event as an example to illustrate how the table is used to 
distinguish real treatment effects from the results of data-snooping. In the case of Illinois, there 
are nine pairs of contiguous border counties, and the mean adjusted treatment effect of this 
deregulation event turns out to be 0.46. Checking the table of critical values, in the row 
corresponding to the case of “9 county-pairs”, we find three critical values, 0.61 for 90%, 0.82 for 
95%, and 1.40 for 99% confidence level. Since the actual treatment effect 0.46 is smaller than 
0.61, it is established that in the case of Illinois, significant treatment effect cannot be established 
statistically in the years surrounding the deregulation event. The reason is that even by data-
snooping, in more than 10% of chance you can find a mean treatment effect greater than 0.61 if 9 
independent county-pairs are drawn from borders where such differential treatments did not occur 
in reality. See Section 4.3 for details. 
 
However, in actual deregulation events, along a regulation change border, we 
usually use more than one county-pair to form the mean treatment effect.  Thus, we also 
need to obtain the critical values for the mean treatment effect of an N-observations 
sample when N>1. Assuming that the treatment effect of each individual county-pair 
along a regulation change border is independent of its neighboring county-pairs along the 
same segment of the border, the critical values for the mean treatment effect of an N-
observations sample can be analytically extrapolated from the case of one single county-
pair.  Specifically, the critical values for the mean treatment effect based on N 







, = , where p indicates the p-value. It 
is easy to see that the critical values for mean treatment effects drop as the number of 
county-pairs increases for a specific deregulation event.  
The critical values for N= 1,2, ... ,50 presented in Table 4 are calculated this way.  
The values suggest that, for example, if there are 10 county-pairs along a specific 
regulation change border, then we require the mean treatment effect of the 10 county-
pairs to be greater than  % 78 . 0
10
% 45 . 2 =  to be statistically significant at the 95% level. 
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If there are 20 county-pairs, however, the threshold critical value will be lowered to 
% 55 . 0
20
% 45 . 2 = .  
In Section 4.4, we will drop the assumption of spatial independence, and analyze 
how this effect would change the critical values. 
4.4. Taking into account spatial correlations of treatment effects 
The critical values  produced in the last section for N>1 samples are unbiased 
only when we can assume that there are no correlations of treatment effects within a 
chain of neighboring county-pairs along the same segment of a border. If this were the 
case, then treatment effects obtained from each of the N county-pairs would be 
independent, and it would be valid to use the extrapolated critical values produced in the 
last section to the mean of the N treatment effects. 
Spatial correlation, however, is typically present in the empirical setting of this 
study. Treatment effects for two pairs of counties next to each other are likely to be 
positively correlated, as counties on the same side of the regulation change border receive 
(or delay to receive) the same state-specific policy shocks. Not accounting for this factor 
would lead us to underestimate the standard errors of the mean treatment effects.  
  Again, we will use randomized simulations to empirically solve the problem. In 
the last section, we randomly draw one single county-pair in each simulated scenario, 
form the reference distribution of treatment effects, obtain critical values for the N=1 case, 
and then extrapolate them to the mean treatment effects of N>1 cases using the formula 
N
K Kn
1 = , assuming that treatment effects for neighboring county-pairs along a 
border are independent of each other. In the new series of placebo deregulations, in each 
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of them, instead of an individual county-pair we draw a chain of N (N>1) neighboring 
county-pairs along a border, and as usual choose the year of deregulation, and select 
which side of the border is to receive the deregulation first. The treatment effect is 
calculated in the same way as in the case of single county-pair. What differs is that now 
we will calculate and retain the mean of the treatment effects of the N neighboring 
county-pairs (when N>1).  
We simulate all possible combinations (scenarios), and repeat the procedure for 
different N values (the length of the chains of neighboring county-pairs). As N increases, 
the number of possible combinations (and thus, draws of simulations) is reduced, because 
there are fewer non-event borders where longer chain of neighboring counties can be 
sampled.  
As the products of the simulations, we obtain 50 empirical distributions of mean 
treatment effects, for N=1, 2, ... ,50, respectively. Based on these distributions, we can 
then empirically establish a table of critical values that are free from the influence of 
spatial correlations of treatment effects within a chain of neighboring county-pairs, 
without knowing the precise model of the spatial dependence.  The table of critical values 
is presented in Table 5, for sample size from 1 to 50.   To illustrate the changes in critical 
values after taking into account spatial correlations, Figure 5 plots two curves based on 
the two groups of critical values, with only one taking into account spatial correlations. 
The comparison clearly reveals the severe downward bias of standard errors when 
positive spatial correlations are not taken into account. 
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Table 5:  Statistical table of critical values for the mean treatment effects 
(robust to spatial correlations) 
 
Statistical Confidence level 
(p-value)  Number of 
county-pairs 











1 5,852  1.82  2.45  4.20 
2 5,423  1.51  2.02  3.32 
3 5,005  1.36  1.82  2.94 
4 4,631  1.25  1.63  2.80 
5 4,268  1.16  1.51  2.50 
6 3,905  1.12  1.43  2.44 
7 3,575  1.05  1.34  2.34 
8 3,300  1.01  1.26  2.22 
9 3,047  0.94  1.23  2.08 
10 2,805  0.89  1.16  1.91 
11 2,574  0.85  1.11  1.68 
12 2,354  0.82  1.06  1.59 
13 2,167  0.81  1.03  1.51 
14 2,002  0.80  1.03  1.45 
15 1,859  0.77  1.02  1.40 
16 1,727  0.75  1.01  1.35 
17 1,595  0.72  0.99  1.30 
18 1,463  0.70  0.96  1.24 
19 1,364  0.69  0.92  1.19 
20 1,287  0.67  0.91  1.13 
25 902  0.65  0.78 0.97 
30 539  0.65  0.74 0.95 
35 297  0.63  0.73 0.89 
40 143  0.64  0.69 0.80 
45 66  0.51  0.54 0.65 
50 11  0.50  0.55 0.55 
 
Note: Along the 32 segments of non-event borders, randomized simulations let fictitious placebo 
deregulations take place on any of the 266 pairs of contiguous border counties, in any one year 
between 1979 and 1989. Once the state to be scheduled for an earlier placebo deregulation is 
selected (either side of the border can be selected), counties on the other side of the state border 
will be scheduled to deregulate five years later. Raw treatment effects will be calculated based on 
the difference-in-differences of average annual growth rate between the “post-” and “pre-” period 
and between the two contiguous counties. The “adjusted treatment effect” is then obtained by 
taking the residuals from a regression of raw treatment effect on change in income gap and 
growth opportunity gap between the “post-” and “pre-” periods.  
Spatial correlation of treatment effects exists within a chain of neighboring county-pairs along the 
same segment of a border. To make the procedure robust to such spatial dependences, we draw at 
each simulation a chain of N neighboring county-pairs instead of a single individual county-pair. 
Simulations are done for N-observation chains (N=1,2,...,50, respectively). After simulating all 
possible scenarios (the number of scenarios varies depending on N, the length of the chain), an 
empirical distribution of the mean treatment effects can be obtained. Fifty such distributions are 
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obtained, for N=1,2,...,50, respectively. As the placebo deregulations are completely fictitious, the 
50 empirical distributions can inform us, by a certain percentage of chance how large a mean 
treatment effect we can obtain by randomly selecting a chain of N (N=1,2,...,50) county-pairs 
from borders where cross-border differential treatment did not occur in reality. To save space, for 
N>20, critical values are reported in the table only for the multiples of 5s. 
Let’s take an actual deregulation event as an example to illustrate how the table is used to 
distinguish real treatment effects from the results of data-snooping. In the case of Illinois, there 
are nine pairs of contiguous border counties, and the mean adjusted treatment effect of this 
deregulation event turns out to be 0.46. Checking the table of critical values, in the row 
corresponding to the case of 9 observations, we find three critical values, 0.94 for 90%, 1.23 for 
95%, and 2.08 for 99% confidence level. Since the actual treatment effect 0.46 is smaller then 
0.94, in the case of Illinois, significant treatment effect cannot be established statistically in the 
years surrounding the deregulation. The reason is that even by data-snooping, by a greater than 
10% random chance, a mean treatment effect greater than 0.61 can occur if a chain of 9 
neighboring county-pairs is drawn from borders where treatments did not actually occur in reality. 
See Section 4.4 for details. 
 
Figure 5:  Empirical critical values of mean treatment effects:  Before and 
after adjusted for spatial correlations 
 
 


















































Note: In the study, we use placebo deregulations to create critical values for the mean treatment 
effects, to distinguish real treatment effects from the results of data-snooping. The critical values 
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treatment effect we could obtain from data-snooping on the non-event borders where 
deregulations do not take place in reality; and thus, when one obtains a mean treatment effect 
from an actual deregulation event that actually occurs, how likely it is the result of data-snooping 
vs. genuine treatment effects. When the number of county-pairs used to evaluate a deregulation 
event is greater than one, the standard errors of mean treatment effects could be biased 
downwards by positive spatial correlations of treatment effects among neighboring county-pairs 
within a regulation change border. We rely on randomized simulations to adjust for spatial 
dependence. In the simulations, we apply placebo deregulations to a chain of N neighboring 
county-pairs instead of to an individual county-pair. The empirical distribution of mean treatment 
effects obtained from such simulations, thus, is robust to the influence of spatial correlations. In 
the chart, we present the critical values of treatment effect estimates before and after they have 
been adjusted for spatial correlations. It is clear from the chart that we would understate the 
estimation standard errors had we not adjusted for positive spatial correlations. See Section 4.4 
for details. 
 
We take N=10 as an example to illustrate the difference between the two tables of 
critical values (one does not adjust for spatial dependence, and the other does), and how 
the table of critical values can be used to assess treatment effects of actual deregulations. 
Not considering spatial correlation of treatment effects, when 10 independent county-
pairs are randomly drawn from the non-event borders, it is expected that the mean 
treatment effects will be greater than  % 78 . 0
10
% 45 . 2 =  in 5% of the time, according to 
the first table of critical values (Table 4) produced in Section 4.3. However, when a chain 
of 10 neighboring counties along a border is drawn (which is what happens when we 
evaluate actual deregulations), according to the second table of critical values (Table 5), 
5% of chance actually exists that a mean treatment effect greater than 1.16% will be 
found.  The comparison shows that positive spatial correlations of treatment effects, if not 
taken into account, would substantially bias the standard errors downwards. In the rest of 
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5. Evaluating Twenty-Three Actual Events of Deregulations 
  After obtaining a statistical table (Table 5) of critical values that are robust to 
spatial correlation of treatment effects, we are ready to perform assessments on each of 
the 23 actual events of branching deregulations identified in Section 2. The critical values 
indicate that, for a treatment effect of an actual deregulation event to be statistically 
significant at the 95% level, the magnitude of the effect must be greater than the fictitious 
treatment effects obtained in 95% of the placebo deregulations described in Section 4. 
In Table 6, some descriptive statistics are presented for the treatment group 
(deregulated counties), the first control group (border regulated counties), and the second 
control group (hinterland counties), respectively, on several variables of interest, 
including the means and medians of growth rates, income per capita, and manufacturing 
share. The averages and medians are calculated by pooling all county-pairs used in the 
study, from all 23 events of deregulations, and serve to help readers gain an overall 
picture of the range of average growth rate in the “pre-” and “post-” periods. Assessments, 
however, will be conducted separately for each individual deregulation event. Pooling 
will obscure the important idiosyncratic information of each individual event, because 
Wall (2004) already shows that the deregulation effects are quite heterogeneous across 
individual events, which spanned two decades of radical changes in the banking sector, 
and took place in different locations under different circumstances. Unlike previous 
studies, we have the luxury of studying individual events separately because the use of 
county as unit of analysis has increased the degree of freedom in our estimations. 
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 Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
Number of 
observations  285 285 285 285  249  249 
            
Average growth rate 
in "pre-" period (%)  1.74 1.69 1.75 1.67  1.66  1.49 
            
Average growth rate 
in "post-" period" (%)  1.40 1.34 0.99 1.00  1.07  0.92 
          
Within 
“Acceleration” (%)  -0.34 -0.06 -0.76 -0.57  -0.59  -0.56 
          
Standard deviation of 
these “accelerations” 
(2.50)  (2.30)   (2.36)   
          
Income per capita (at 
the time of 
deregulation, in 1980 
USD) 
8,538 8,398 8,529 8,486  8,306  8,126 
            
Manufacturing 
income share at the 
time of deregulation 
(ratio) 
0.26 0.25 0.28 0.28  0.27  0.27 
 
Note:  For the actual deregulations events, 285 pairs of contiguous border counties can be 
examined. Using hinterland counties as the second control group, the number of pairs is reduced 
to 249, because no proper hinterland counties can be found for some treatment counties. The 
Table presents the average (and median) growth rates, in the pre-deregulation period and in the 
post-deregulation period, and the difference between the two, i.e., the “within” treatment effect 
(not difference-in-differences treatment effect), for the treatment group (deregulated counties), 
first control group (border regulated counties), and second control group (hinterland regulated 
counties), respectively. The Table also presents the mean (median) income per capita and 
manufacturing income share at the time of deregulation. All of the 23 deregulation events are 
pooled together to produce the summary statistics in the table for the purpose of helping readers 
gain an overall understanding of the characteristics of the county economies examined in the 
study. The state-level deregulations spanned two decades of radical changes in the banking sector 
and their effects were heterogeneous across events; therefore, whether a significant growth 
acceleration had actually occurred after a specific deregulation event must be evaluated separately, 
in light of the heterogeneity of results among deregulation events taking place in different years 
during a nearly two-decade period. The detailed assessment results are presented in Tables VII 
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5.1. Obtaining point estimates of treatment effects   
We first need to obtain a correct point estimate of mean treatment effect for each 
actual deregulation event, adjusted for biases potentially created by, as discussed in 
Section 3.2, change in income gap and change in growth opportunity gap between the 
“pre-” and “post-” periods.  As discussed in Section 3.4, for the adjustment to truly reflect 
effects unrelated to the deregulation itself, we will apply the fitted coefficients obtained 
from the non-event sample.  
  A narrowed income gap or widened growth opportunity gap over the 10-year 
period before deregulation, if not adjusted, could create upward bias for the point 
estimate of treatment effect. The following formula based on coefficients obtained from 
Eq. (5) in Section 4.2 can help us correct for the biases. 
Adjusted Treatment Effect (TE) = Raw TE + 0.1294 × change in income gap – 
0.3816 × change in growth opportunity gap                                                     (6) 
The coefficients are obtained from the non-event sample. Note that had we 
estimated and used the coefficients based on the in-sample, i.e., where actual 
deregulations took place, the coefficients would be contaminated by the sample-selection 
problem discussed in Section 3.4. 
The mean treatment effect of a deregulation event is estimated based on 12 
county-pairs on average. This truly raises the degree of freedom in estimation and 
reduces standard errors of the point estimates. In Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), and other 
similar studies that use state as the unit of analysis, only one treated subject (state) can be 
evaluated for each deregulation event. To nominally raise degree of freedom and reduce 
estimation standard errors of OLS coefficients, they typically had to pool together all 
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times-series information and all deregulation events. This strategy has a potential 
problem: Bertrand et al. (2004) show that by pooling serially correlated time-series 
information, the standard errors are likely to be understated, even after autocorrelation is 
explicitly modeled. Furthermore, Wall (2004) points out that the pooling of different 
deregulation events assumes homogeneity of the treatment effects, which he shows to be 
actually quite heterogeneous across events. Nevertheless, Jayaratne and Strahan do stress 
that, based on their estimation methodology, it is a general phenomenon, not driven by 
individual cases, that deregulated states grew relatively faster after deregulation as 
compared to control states that at first had not yet deregulated. They show that, of the 35 
states that deregulated since 1972, all but 6 states performed better (but not necessarily 
statistically significantly) than the corresponding control states. The six exceptions were 
New Hampshire, Florida, Michigan, Kansas, Colorado, and New Mexico.  
In Table 7, we report, for each of the 23 actual deregulation events, the mean 
treatment effects (both raw and adjusted), the number of observations (i.e., number of 
county-pairs) used to form the mean treatment effects, and the average growth rate of the 
deregulated counties in the “pre-” period. According to the results, the point estimates of 
the treatment effects are quite heterogeneous across individual deregulation events, which 
confirms Freeman (2002) and Wall’s (2004) findings. In 7 out of the 23 events examined 
in the study, the treatment effects are actually negative (Maine, Connecticut, 
Pennsylvania, Georgia, Kansas, Texas, and Wisconsin). In another two cases (New York 
and Ohio), the positive treatment effects are as small as 0.01%. Among these nine cases, 
only Kansas is indicated by Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) to have grown slower after 
deregulation, compared to control states.  
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Table 7: Evaluating the actual deregulations events using the contiguous 






















Maine 1975  4  1.07 -1.81  -1.35  negative 
New York  1976  15  0.85 0.37  0.01  insignificant 
New Jersey  1977  8  1.98 0.65  0.59  insignificant 
Virginia  1978  27  4.14 0.16  0.64  insignificant 
Ohio 1979  41  2.10 0.20  0.01  insignificant 
Connecticut  1980  4  1.44 -0.46  -0.24  negative 
Alabama 1981  27  2.00 0.20  0.40  insignificant 
Pennsylvania  1982  6  1.77 -1.94  -0.70  negative 
Georgia 1983  12 0.60 -1.11  -0.85  negative 
Massachusetts  1984  3  2.32 0.54  0.32  insignificant 
Nebraska 1985  11  0.88 0.38  0.23  insignificant 
Tennessee  1985  25  1.65 1.52  1.31  1% 
Mississippi 1986  5  0.56 -0.33  0.60  insignificant 
Kansas  1987  11  1.15 0.07  -0.09  negative 
Michigan 1987 5  0.51 2.71  1.94  5% 
North Dakota  1987  6  2.82 0.34  0.61  insignificant 
West Virginia  1987  4  0.41 0.88  0.76  insignificant 
Illinois  1988  9  0.26 0.09  0.46  insignificant 
Louisiana 1988 8  0.80 0.72  1.15  5% 
Oklahoma  1988  8  1.73 1.50  1.65  1% 
Texas 1988  2  0.75 -0.90  -1.05  negative 
Missouri  1990  28  1.94 0.83  1.09  1% 
Wisconsin 1990 16  0.93 1.43  -0.14  negative 
 
Note: Each of the 23 events of bank branching deregulations is assessed separately to establish 
the statistical significance of its mean treatment effect. A different number of county-pairs is used 
in each deregulation event, determined by geography and the deregulation schedule of its 
neighboring states. The results of the assessments are presented in this table. The raw treatment 
effect is simply the difference-in-differences of average growth rate in the “pre-” and “post-” 
periods between the treatment counties and the control counties. Adjusted treatment effects 
control for change in income gap and growth opportunity gap between the “pre-” and “post-” 
periods, which if not adjusted for can bias the point estimate. The mean treatment effect is 
obtained by averaging the treatment effects of all county-pairs associated with a deregulation 
event. On average, evaluation of a deregulation event is based on 12 county-pairs. The critical 
values of mean treatment effects are empirically obtained through applying placebo deregulations 
to non-event borders. We use the critical values tabulated in Table 5, which already adjust for the 
downward bias created by positive spatial correlation of treatment effects within a chain of 
neighboring county-pairs. We assess the statistical significance of mean treatment effects only 
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5.2. Establishing statistical significance 
  Furthermore, comparing the values of the point estimates to the critical values at 
various confidence levels, obtained from the fictitious placebo deregulation events, 
clearly indicates that most of the positive treatment effects are not statistically 
distinguished from what can be obtained in fictitious treatments. 
  The evaluation results of statistical significance are also indicated in Table 7. Out 
of the 23 actual events of branching deregulations, in seven of them the mean treatment 
effects are negative. Therefore, they are immediately excluded from further examination. 
In the remaining 16 events, the point estimates are at least positive. We compare them 
against the two tables of critical values: one (Table 4) ignores spatial dependence within a 
chain of neighboring county-pairs and is biased downward, whereas the other (Table 5) 
adjusts for it. Using the data from the table that assumes no spatial dependence, which 
underestimates the standard errors, there are only seven events where we can establish 
statistical significance at higher than 90% level.  After adjusting for downward-biased 
standard errors due to positive spatial correlations, only five are left that are statistically 
significant at 90% (or higher) confidence level. These five states are (in alphabetical 
order):  Louisiana (8, 1.15%, >95%), Michigan (5, 1.95%, >95%), Missouri (28, 1.09%, 
>99%), Oklahoma (8, 1.65%, >99%), and Tennessee (25, 1.31%, >99%). Numbers in 
the parentheses are, respectively, number of county-pairs used to calculate the mean 
treatment effect, point estimate of the treatment effect, and statistical confidence level.  
Based on the methodology of this study, we can establish that in these five states, 
growth accelerations indeed occurred in the years surrounding the deregulation events. 
These five growth accelerations are economically quite sizable considering that the 
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average (unconditional) annual growth rates in the “pre-” period is only about 1.7%. This 
magnitude is nevertheless plausible in the several years immediately after deregulation 
because a small change in the value of stock of existing capital can have a large effect on 
economic output if the benefits are realized in a short period of time (Jayaratne and 
Strahan, 1996, p. 658). Nevertheless, these five cases are out of the 23 events examined. 
In the vast majority (18 cases, or 80% of the total) of the state-level branching 
deregulations we examine, significant economic growth accelerations are not able to be 
established in the years surrounding the deregulation events.  
It is worth mentioning that all of the five growth accelerations took place after 
1985, in the later part of our sample period. Prior to that, there was no single case of 
significant growth accelerations and the average treatment effect is – 0.12%. Year 1985 
was the beginning of a period of dramatically increased bank failure rates, which drove 
small banks to drop their opposition to intra- and inter-state acquisitions to find higher 
purchase prices. Thus, these deregulations took place in totally different circumstances, 
were more unexpected, and could have been driven by different conditions than their 
predecessors. Another important difference of these five events from others is that the 
interstate banking deregulations in all five cases took place before or at the same year of 
the intrastate branching deregulations, and therefore, these branching deregulations may 
introduce stronger potential competitions than in other states, by also allowing out-of-
state (e.g., from New York) large competitors to participate. To sum up, there could be a 
structural break in 1985 on the nature and characteristic of the branching deregulations 
and on the relations between deregulation events and growth accelerations. 
The main goal of this paper is to provide a generalized methodology and 
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evaluation framework to assess the economic effect of many types of state-specific 
regulatory changes, and branching deregulation is but one example. Thus, we do not 
intend to explore very deeply to provide rigorous evidence to explain why we have found 
what we have found, although we will offer some plausible explanations later in Section 
7.  
So far we have established that, in 5 out of 23 cases, local economic growth 
appeared to significantly accelerate in the years surrounding the deregulation events, 
although it is a different question whether deregulations had caused them. In the other 
events, no significant correlation between deregulation events and growth accelerations 
can be statistically established. Hopefully, future research can go deeper into what we 
have found empirically. Before providing some of our explanations of the results, we will 
first spend some time in Section 6 to establish the robustness of the methodology used in 
this study.  
 
6. Robustness Check: Geographic Spillover of Deregulation Effects? 
If local residents can easily obtain access to credit from commercial banks on 
opposite sides of state borders, then the results of no deregulation effects can be easily 
explained by direct or indirect spillover of lending from the newly deregulated states to 
their neighbors across state borders. If border counties on both sides of the regulation 
change border benefit from the deregulation, then it is not surprising that we cannot find 
differences between them.  
Cross-border lending by local commercial banks, however, should be minimal. In 
banking antitrust analysis done by Federal Reserve Banks, the local market outside 
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metropolitan areas is usually defined as a single county.
17 There are many reasons why 
banking markets are local, although the lending distance of nonbank financial institutions 
and credit-card-type lending in particular has been increasing over time.  
First, information asymmetry increases in distance as a result of communication 
and transport costs (Degryse and Ongena, 2004). Petersen and Rajan (2002), and Kwast 
et al. (1997) both find that in the 1980s, when most of the branching deregulations took 
place, the median distance between banks and borrowers was 4 miles (and the 75
th 
percentile is 12 miles), which is well within county boundaries.  Petersen and Rajan 
(2002) also find that 67% of the communications between banks and borrowers were 
done by face-to-face personal meeting. Garmaise and Moskowitz’s (2004, 2006) data on 
commercial real estate loans also suggest localized lending with a maximum radius of 15 
miles. Many believe that the recent adoption of credit scoring models could increase 
lending distance. However, using Community Reinvestment Act data, Brevoort and 
Hannan (2006) show that distance is if anything becoming more of an important factor 
even within a local market.  
Second, state borders can create contract-enforcing barriers greater than those 
created by county borders. When defaults or disputes arise, in order for banks to recover 
loans from out-of-state debtors, they could incur substantial costs in the process of going 
through the court system in a different state because their own in-house legal specialists 
could not have accumulated sufficient experiences in the neighboring state’s bankruptcy 
                                                 
17 The Fed’s definition of local banking market is mainly based on the commuting pattern information 
obtained from the “Journey to Work” Census, assuming that if people do cross borders in a mass scale on a 
regular basis, then such borders do not effectively stop banks from competing to provide services to 
residents on the other side of the border, and the two counties should belong to the same local market. The 
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and foreclosure laws.   
To sum up, even if borrowers are willing to take the great hassles to travel across 
state borders, bankers could find it costly to lend to them, for information asymmetry 
reasons. Nevertheless, there could be some sort of indirect spillover of lending across 
state borders that could invalidate the comparison made in this study. For instance, 
residents in the newly deregulated states could now have more disposable cash on hand, 
which could be lent to their friends or relatives on opposite sides of state borders.  
To consider this possibility, we collect a second group of counties as an 
alternative control, and then perform the same difference-in-differences analysis. The 
members of the treatment group remain the same. We will now compare the deregulated 
(treated) counties not to their immediate neighbors, but to their paired hinterland counties 
(as defined in Section 2.3) on the opposite side of the border. The hinterland counties are 
located within the still-regulated states, but farther away from the state borders. In other 
words, now the counties in the treatment group and the control group are co-contiguous, 
with the border deregulated counties located in-between them (see Figure 2 for an 
example). The “Journey to Work” Census shows that although there still is a small 
number of people commuting between contiguous counties, the number is sharply 
reduced to trivial if the flow is between two co-contiguous (not directly contiguous) 
counties.  
If there were spillovers of deregulation effects that affected our previous results, 
which use border counties as control, the use of hinterland counties as control should 
reduce such influence, and the same difference-in-differences tests should signal many 
more cases of significant growth accelerations. If there is any geographic spillover of 
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lending across state borders, the hinterland counties that are farther away from state 
borders should not benefit as much, because spillovers should mainly benefit the border 
counties, if it is assumed that it takes lenders more efforts to do business with more 
distant borrowers, and that people have more friends in immediate adjacent counties. The 
empirical design, thus, does not rely on assumptions about particular types of cross-
border spillovers.   
The results of the robustness test using hinterland counties as a second control 
group are presented in Table 8. The use of an alternative control group does not alter the 
main evaluation results. In only one more deregulation event (1986 in Mississippi) a 
statistically significant treatment effect is identified. In this event, using hinterland 
counties as a control group would signal growth acceleration marginally significant at 
90% confidence level. Furthermore, the statistical significance levels of the original five 
growth acceleration cases are higher when border counties as opposed to hinterland 
counties are used as control group, which goes against the hypothesis that cross-border 
spillover of deregulation effects bias against finding significant deregulation effects. The 
results in general suggest that cross-border spillover of deregulation effects should not 
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Table 8: Evaluating the actual deregulation events using the hinterland 






















Maine 1975  3  1.07 -0.44  -0.63  negative 
New York  1976  14  0.85 0.79  0.28  insignificant 
New Jersey  1977  6  1.98 0.17  0.41  insignificant 
Virginia  1978  16  4.14 -0.09  0.29  insignificant 
Ohio 1979  35  2.10 -0.05  -0.26  negative 
Connecticut  1980  2  1.44 -1.63  -0.73  negative 
Alabama 1981  22 2.00 0.09  0.37  insignificant 
Pennsylvania  1982  2  1.77 0.59  1.16  insignificant 
Georgia 1983  12  0.60 -0.44  0.18  insignificant 
Massachusetts  1984  3  2.32 -0.33  -0.06  negative 
Nebraska 1985  11 0.88 0.16  -0.11  negative 
Tennessee  1985  25  1.65 0.86  0.77  10% 
Mississippi 1986  5  0.56 1.28  1.55  5% 
Kansas  1987  11  1.15 0.56  0.49  insignificant 
Michigan 1987  5  0.51 2.68  1.99  5% 
North Dakota  1987  6  2.82 -3.63  -2.26  negative 
West Virginia  1987  4  0.41 -0.24  0.20  insignificant 
Illinois  1988  9  0.26 -0.80  0.11  insignificant 
Louisiana 1988 8  0.80 0.57  1.05  10% 
Oklahoma  1988  8  1.73 0.51  1.27  5% 
Texas 1988  2  0.75 -1.65  -1.33  negative 
Missouri  1990  24  1.94 0.66  1.06  1% 
Wisconsin 1990 16  0.93 2.21  0.53  insignificant 
 
Note: Each of the 23 events of branching deregulation is assessed separately to establish the 
statistical significance of its mean treatment effect. A different number of county-pairs is used in 
each deregulation event, determined by geography and the deregulation schedule of its 
neighboring states. The results of the assessments are presented in this table. The raw treatment 
effect is simply the difference-in-differences of average growth rate in the “pre-” and “post-” 
periods between the treatment counties and the control counties (in this case, the second control 
group of “hinterland counties”). Adjusted treatment effects control for change in income gap and 
growth opportunity gap between “pre-” and “post-” periods, which if not adjusted for can bias the 
point estimate. The mean treatment effect is obtained by averaging the treatment effects of all 
county-pairs associated with a deregulation event. Evaluation of a deregulation event is based on 
11 county-pairs on average. The critical values of mean treatment effects are empirically obtained 
through simulating placebo deregulations on non-event borders. We use the critical values 
tabulated in Table 5, which already adjust for the downward bias created by positive spatial 
correlation of treatment effects within a chain of neighboring county-pairs. We assess the 
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7. Discussions  
Did removal of restrictions on statewide branching create significant growth 
accelerations in deregulated U.S. states? Previous empirical literature has found that 
liberalization of statewide branching widely and significantly accelerated local economic 
growth. This study provides a more precise test by comparing border counties in 
deregulated states with their contiguous neighbors on opposite sides of state borders 
where intrastate branching was at first prohibited. The comparisons reveal that significant 
growth acceleration in the years surrounding the deregulation events is not a general 
phenomenon as suggested by Jayaratne and Strahan (1996). In only 5 out of 23 of the 
deregulation events examined, statistically significant growth acceleration can be firmly 
established at  a >90% confidence level.  
The endogeneity problem could be one of the reasons why previous studies tend 
to find correlation between deregulation and growth accelerations. Kroszner and Strahan 
(1999), for instance, find that the relative strength of winners (large banks and small, 
bank-dependent firms) and losers (small banks and the rival insurance firms) of 
deregulation can explain the timing of branching deregulation across states. Also, when 
state-level economic growth is studied, it is possible that the correlation found is created 
by deregulations being induced by an expectation of growth opportunities that are not 
observed by econometricians. State-level deregulations occurred in waves, usually 
clustered by region, and correlations identified in existing literature could pick up 
regional growth trends. The advantage of studying county-level growth is that it is 
unlikely that economic conditions of a county had influenced regulatory decisions at state 
level made by state legislatures, which have to accommodate interests of all 
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constituencies, not only the border counties.   
Moreover, Wheelock (2003) points out that states in the South and New England 
tended to deregulate earlier than Midwestern states, and several of these had among the 
highest average annual growth rates. It is possible that the growth accelerations are 
region-wide phenomena independent of banking regulations in individual states. When 
previous researchers compared earlier deregulated states in these regions with states in 
other regions, it is possible that they picked up the region-wide growth acceleration trend 
as evidence for the impact of banking deregulation at the state level. Our analysis at the 
lower geographic level is relatively free from the influence of such cross-region 
heterogeneity.   
In financing economic growth, there could be a substitution effect between 
commercial banks (which were subject to branching regulation) and nonbank financial 
institutions (which have been free from such geographic restrictions). One explanation 
for the results of this study could be that local entrepreneurs are able to substitute other 
sources of financing (e.g., credit from nonbank financial institutions that lend at a longer 
distance) for bank financing. In the United States, long before the deregulations, nonbank 
financial institutions had developed gradually to meet the demands frustrated by 
geographically restricted commercial banks. In the long term, the financing constraints 
created by branching regulation became less binding as nonbank financial institutions and 
capital markets reduced firms’ dependence on banks. The negative effect of bank 
regulation on the local economy could have been overstated by not taking into account 
these substitution effects.  
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irony that the cost of regulation is usually the lowest at the time it is removed. In the 
history of the U.S. financial service industry, before an exclusionary statute comes to be 
formally rescinded, most of the effects targeted by the rescission will have already been 
tolerated by the enforcement system for years. Usually, statutory change does not occur 
until circumventive activity has driven the protective value of existing rules to their 
proponents below the amount opponents are willing to pay for their removal. Prior to the 
deregulations, the value of geographic exclusion had been eroded by technological 
innovations in lending. According to Petersen and Rajan (2002), lending distance of 
nonbank finance companies was growing rapidly in the 1970s and 1980s.
18 The increased 
ability of finance companies to lend to distant borrowers without setting up local 
branches clearly had made branching regulations less effective over time in protecting the 
rents of local banks, which could explain why branching deregulations, at the time they 
took place, usually had already lost relevance to the local economy. 
In the short term, it was still possible that, in the past, regulations and geographic 
restrictions on banks’ expansions had inflicted large costs on the U.S. economy, in 
particular at the early stage of industrialization, as the absence of big banks posed 
constraints on financial needs of growing industrial corporations
19. In the long term, such 
constraints have been greatly relieved because the development of capital market and 
unregulated nonbank financial institutions has turned the U.S. economy into one that is 
                                                 
18 The median lending distance of nonbanks increased from 15.5 miles in the 1970s to 42 miles in the 1980s, 
and the share of in-person communication between borrowers and finance companies dropped from 27% to 
12% among all types of communications, including phone-call and mail, whereas for banks, it just dropped 
from 77% to 67%. 
19 Giedeman (2005) finds that, during 1911-1922, restrictions on branch banking cause the severity of 
external finance constraints to increase with firm size. Rousseau and Wachtel (2005) find that the positive 
relation between finance and growth exists only for economies at per capita income level between $3,000 
and $12,000 (in 1995 constant USD), which may suggest that branching restrictions were more harmful in 
the past than now.  
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Furthermore, Kane (1996) and Kroszner and Strahan (1999) have pointed out the  
less bank-dependent than its European counterparts. Furthermore, market players, to meet 
the frustrated demand and to exploit profit opportunities, have been constantly 
circumventing and eroding the burdensome regulations via legal loopholes, contractual 
and information-processing innovations, regulatory/structural arbitrage, and interpretive 
changes in statute-implementing regulations that regulatory bodies actually enforce 
(Kane [1981, 1984, 1996] has provided detailed analyses).  As Kane (1981, p. 359) 
asserts, “In the 1970s, loophole mining and fabrication became the main business of 
modern depository institutions.” The development of all of these substitutes, however, 
had taken up significant time, talents, and money. To sum up, in the past, banking 
regulation could have inflicted costs on the economy in the endless “arm race” in 
loophole-mining and re-regulation between market players and regulators. Despite its 
long-term irrelevance, branching restrictions in the U.S. could still be bad because it may 
have inflicted costs in the short term, which could mean several decades.  
 
8. Implications for European banking market integration 
The results of this paper based on US state-level deregulation experiences can 
also shed some light on the potential economic benefits of the ongoing banking market 
integration in Europe.  Before the removal of restrictions on interstate banking, the 
United States actually had 50 separate banking systems (one for each state); before the 
removal of restrictions on statewide banking, each county within a state was actually a 
separate banking system. Therefore, for academic purpose we may draw analogy between 
the European Union and the United States; a European country and a US state; a sub-
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national region within a European country and a US county, to make an educated guess 
on the potential benefits of European banking market integration.  
This study finds that the state-level deregulations in the US produced uneven 
results: large effects for some states, insignificant for many others, and negative for the 
rest. The study shows that the bank branching deregulations that took place before 1985 
were in general not followed by faster economic growth. As a matter of fact, these earlier 
liberalizers grew on average 0.12% per year slower compared to their neighbors. 
However, it does not follow that our results have to be inconsistent with the Jayaratne and 
Strahan (1996) study, which finds positive effects on average. We need to look into the 
heterogeneity of the results to make a fair and comprehensive assessment. In contrast to 
the negative results of the earlier deregulation events, deregulations taking place after 
1985 were in general associated with positive effects and there were five cases (Louisiana, 
Michigan, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Tennessee) in which the intra-state branching 
deregulations were followed by statistically significant growth accelerations. I noticed 
that in all of these five cases, inter-state banking deregulations took place before or at 
least at the same year of the intra-state branching deregulations. Therefore, in these cases 
the introduction of nationwide potential acquirers (mainly from New York and North 
Carolina) created greater competitive pressures than did most (nine out of ten, the 
exception being Massachusetts in 1984) of the statewide branching deregulations before 
1985 that did not open the markets to only in-state or regional competitors. 
The US experiences have implications for the banking market integration in 
Europe because we can compare European countries to the US states, and the regions 
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within a European country to the US counties
20. The results of this study would suggest 
that removing barriers that fragment the national banking market within a European 
country can produce greater benefit for the national economy if foreign investors and 
banks are not discriminated to own and control domestic banks. In a domestic banking 
market that is fragmented before the removal of domestic barriers, most domestic banks 
are likely to be small, and few national champions exist to actively acquire small players 
and rapidly consolidate the market after the removal of legal barriers. Mergers among 
small or equal size partners are likely to be followed by more difficult (corporate) cultural 
and organizational integration between the two partners and the realization of revenue 
and cost synergy. The results of this study would suggest that: (1) in Europe the 
involvement of (large) foreign banks can help better exploit the opportunities made 
available by the removal of within-country legal barriers; (2) the fostering of national 
champions through the removal of domestic barriers can make the domestic banking 
sector more competitive in the pan-European market, as can be evident by the successes 
of New York and North Carolina banks in US national banking in the post-Riegle-Neal 
era (since the late 1990s). The early integration of statewide banking market in these two 
states had allowed state-level banking champions to emerge and to develop earlier than 
their counterparts in other states in experiences and capacity of taking over out-of-state 
markets when it becomes possible after the removal of inter-state legal barriers.  
                                                 
20 We believe this comparison is realistic. Forni and Reichlin (1997) decompose output fluctuations of the 
European Union (within-country) regions into Europe-wide, national, and regional components, and output 
fluctuations of U.S. counties into national, state, and county-specific components. They find that variance 
composition is similar, with Europe-wide or U.S. national components explaining nearly half of the 
variance, and region or county-specific components explaining more than (European) national or (US) 
state-specific components.  
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This study finds that the removal of statewide branching restrictions had uneven 
effects on different states. The effect of a specific deregulation depends on where and 
when it takes place; and the actual level of competition already existing in the local 
markets before the removal of legal barriers. From the results I have noticed that the local 
(county-level) banking markets that were previously more competitive usually benefited 
less from the deregulations.  In previously more concentrated (competitive) local markets, 
deregulations were in general associated with larger (smaller) effects. A similar 
difference is found in the comparison of rural versus urban banking markets. The reason 
is quite intuitive: if a local market is already quite competitive although the competition 
arises solely from the locals; then the exclusion of competition from outside the county is 
unlikely to be a binding constraint for the local economy and borrowers, and the removal 
of the barriers is unlikely to create much extra benefit either. This is true for most urban 
markets (such as New York and Los Angles) in the US, because in these places local 
competitors are already sufficient for the market to be very contestable. 
In Europe, domestic banking markets are more competitive in some countries 
(regions) than in others. The strengthening of nationwide or Europe-wide competition 
thus could generate uneven benefits across countries and regions: some may benefit more 
than do others. In Germany and Italy for example, domestic markets are fragmented for 
historical and institutional reasons because local savings banks do not compete against 
each other in the same local markets.  In such markets, if the domestic barriers against 
inter-market competition are removed, then the addition of outside competition could 
contribute significantly to higher level of competition. However, such extra benefits 
could be smaller for metropolitan areas such as London or Paris. In large cities, the 
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greater market size allows large number of strong competitors to co-exist; and the local 
markets are typically over-banked already. In such cases, further entry by outsiders may 
not have a significant impact on bank market competition, because the local players have 
already created fierce competition among themselves, as are the cases also in the Dutch 
market (Claessens and Laeven, 2004). 
European Union as a whole is comparable to the United States in terms of 
population, economy size, and the level of economic and financial development. Across 
regions within the United States the institutional environment such as the legal system is 
more homogenous, compared with across countries within the European Union. With the 
absence of cultural and language barriers within the United States, the economic benefits 
we have observed from the US deregulation experiences are likely to be an upper bound 
estimate of the potential economic benefits of the  European banking market integration. 
Nevertheless, it is still possible that the banking market integration in Europe could 
produce greater benefits than in the US.  
First, the costs of geographic restrictions in the US could have been higher had 
nonbank financial institutions been underdeveloped (and thus, could not effectively 
substitute for the role of commercial banks when they were restricted), or had 
corporations had relatively limited cross-border access to nonbank financial institutions 
or the capital markets. This situation happens to be the case in Europe, as European 
capital markets are both underdeveloped and fragmented relative to in the US (Hartmann, 
Maddaloni, and Manganelli, 2003).   
Second, this study finds that the deregulations taking place in the later half of the 
sample generated greater economic benefit than did the earlier deregulations. This is 
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consistent with DeLong and DeYoung (2007)'s results that there exists so-called 
"learning-by-observing" in the banking sector consolidation process so that the earlier 
M&As were typically less successful than the later ones. European banks, if they can 
learn by observing the US experiences, could more efficiently exploit the new 
competitive environment enabled by the removal of within-Europe barriers. For these 
reasons explained above, it is still possible that the strengthening of Europe’s banking 
market integration will create faster, greater, and wider benefits for the European 
economy.  
This study also provides important lessons for future research projects related to 
the economic effects of European banking market integration. The evaluations done in 
this study show that the deregulation effects could be uneven, and the "average effect" 
typically ignores important information.  I believe that an always necessary exercise in 
this type of policy evaluations is to look into the heterogeneity of the evaluation results 
and study why some countries or regions benefit more (or less) from a certain policy 
change, and whether some sectors, segments (e.g., firm-size groups) of the economy or 
population benefit more than do others. Such analyses can provide richer details than do 
the "average effect" results. Such information can help shed light on many competing 
hypotheses regarding how a certain economic policy matters, and in this case, the real 
effects of bank competition. Looking into these details can greatly enhanced the 
information set of the policy-makers, because the economic effects of many policies are 
distributional and cannot be revealed by observing the average effects alone.  
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Appendix:  Contiguous Counties across regulation change borders 
 
Note: The table lists the names of treatment states/counties that deregulated bank branching 
earlier than their neighbors, and their paired control states/counties, which remained regulated for 
a longer period of time. The first control group includes border contiguous counties in the 
regulated states, whereas the second control group includes “hinterland counties” farther away 
from the state borders. The treatment effects estimated based on the difference-in-differences 
growth rates between the treatment counties and their paired contiguous counties are reported. 
The adjusted treatment effects correct the bias created by income gap and growth opportunity gap 

















Maine Oxford  New  Hampshire  Coos   -0.3  -0.7 
Maine Oxford  New  Hampshire  Carroll  Belknap  -3.7  -3.1 
Maine York  New  Hampshire  Carroll  Belknap  -1.2  -1.2 
Maine York  New  Hampshire  Strafford  Merimack  -2.1  -0.4 
New York  Dutchess  Connecticut  Litchfield  Hartford  -1.0  -0.7 
New York  Putnam  Connecticut  Fairfield  New Haven  0.7  0.9 
New York  Westchester  Connecticut  Fairfield  New Haven  -0.7  -0.7 
New York  Rensselaer  Massachusetts  Berkshire  Hampshire  0.1  0.1 
New York  Columbia  Massachusetts  Berkshire  Hampshire  -1.3  -0.3 
New York  Chautauqua  Pennsylvania  Erie  Crawford  1.5  0.7 
New York  Chautauqua  Pennsylvania  Warren  Forest  1.9  1.0 
New York  Cattaraugus  Pennsylvania  McKean  Elk  0.4  0.2 
New York  Allegany  Pennsylvania  Potter  Clinton  0.0  -0.3 
New York  Steuben  Pennsylvania  Tioga  Lycoming  1.2  0.0 
New York  Chemung  Pennsylvania  Bradford  Sullivan  -0.5  -0.6 
New York  Tioga  Pennsylvania  Bradford  Wyoming  1.0  0.5 
New York  Broome  Pennsylvania  Susquehanna  Wyoming  -0.5  -0.3 
New York  Delaware  Pennsylvania  Wayne  Lackawanna  1.9  -0.1 
New York  Sullivan  Pennsylvania  Pike    1.1  -0.2 
New Jersey  Sussex  Pennsylvania  Pike    1.2  0.4 
New Jersey  Warren  Pennsylvania  Monroe  Lackawanna  0.3  1.1 
New Jersey  Warren  Pennsylvania  Northampton Lehigh  0.6  0.6 
New Jersey  Hunterdon  Pennsylvania Bucks  Montgomery  1.8  1.5 
New Jersey  Mercer  Pennsylvania Bucks  Montgomery  0.4  0.5 
New Jersey  Burlington  Pennsylvania Bucks  Lehigh  1.9  1.2 
New Jersey  Camden  Pennsylvania  Philadelphia  Montgomery  1.1  0.8 
New Jersey  Gloucester  Pennsylvania Delaware    -2.1  -1.4 
Virginia  Buchanan  Kentucky  Pike  Martin  -0.7  -0.3 
Virginia  Dickinson  Kentucky  Pike  Floyd  -4.5  -2.4 
Virginia  Wise  Kentucky  Letcher  Knott  -4.2  -0.6 
Virginia  Lee  Kentucky  Harlan  Leslie  0.0  1.4 
Virginia  Lee  Kentucky  Bell  Knox  -1.6  0.7 
Virginia  Lee  Tennessee  Claiborne  Union  0.4  1.1 
Virginia  Lee  Tennessee  Hancock  Grainger  -4.2  0.1 
Virginia  Scott  Tennessee  Hawkins    0.5  0.5 
Virginia  Scott  Tennessee  Sullivan  Washington  -0.5  0.2 
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Virginia  Washington  Tennessee  Sullivan    -0.7  0.4 
Virginia  Washington  Tennessee  Johnson    2.0  1.3 
Virginia  Loudoun  West Virginia  Jefferson    0.7  0.7 
Virginia  Clarke  West Virginia  Jefferson    -3.6  -1.3 
Virginia  Frederick  West Virginia  Berkeley    1.5  1.3 
Virginia  Frederick  West Virginia  Morgan    3.6  1.3 
Virginia  Frederick  West Virginia  Hampshire  2.7  0.8 
Virginia  Shenandoah  West Virginia  Hardy    0.6  0.3 
Virginia  Rockingham  West Virginia  Pendleton  Randolph  2.8  0.5 
Virginia  Highland  West Virginia  Pocahontas  Randolph  0.1  0.7 
Virginia  Bath  West Virginia  Pocahontas  Webster  -0.7  0.4 
Virginia  Alleghany  West Virginia  Greenbrier  Nicholas  3.7  1.7 
Virginia  Craig  West Virginia  Monroe    -0.3  0.3 
Virginia  Giles  West Virginia  Monroe    0.6  0.5 
Virginia  Giles  West Virginia  Mercer  Summers  3.6  1.6 
Virginia  Bland  West Virginia  Mercer  Raleigh  2.3  1.9 
Virginia  Tazewell  West Virginia  McDowell  Wyoming  2.1  2.3 
Virginia  Buchanan  West Virginia  McDowell  Mingo  -1.9  1.6 
Ohio Williams  Indiana  Steuben  LaGrange  -0.7  -1.0 
Ohio Defiance  Indiana  De  Kalb  Noble  0.7  0.3 
Ohio Paulding  Indiana  Allen  Whitley  -1.4  -0.9 
Ohio Van  Wert  Indiana  Adams  Wells  -1.7  -0.8 
Ohio Mercer  Indiana  Jay Blackford  -0.6  0.6 
Ohio Darke  Indiana  Randolph  Delaware  -0.7  0.0 
Ohio Preble  Indiana  Wayne  Henry  -1.5  -0.5 
Ohio Preble  Indiana  Union  Fayette  -0.9  1.1 
Ohio Butler  Indiana  Franklin  Decatur  0.4  0.2 
Ohio Hamilton  Indiana  Dearborn  Ripley  0.9  0.5 
Ohio Hamilton  Kentucky  Boone  Gallatin  1.5  0.6 
Ohio Hamilton  Kentucky  Kenton  Grant  0.7  0.4 
Ohio Hamilton  Kentucky  Campbell  Pendleton  1.2  0.7 
Ohio Clermont  Kentucky  Campbell  Pendleton  -0.2  0.0 
Ohio Clermont  Kentucky  Bracken  Robertson -1.3  -0.7 
Ohio Brown  Kentucky  Mason  Fleming  -0.8  0.0 
Ohio Adams  Kentucky  Lewis  Rowan  2.4  1.2 
Ohio Scioto  Kentucky  Greenup  Carter  3.0  -1.1 
Ohio Lawrence  Kentucky  Boyd  Lawrence  1.4  -0.1 
Ohio Williams  Michigan  Hillsdale  Jackson  0.8  0.4 
Ohio Fulton  Michigan  Lenawee  Washtenaw 0.8  0.2 
Ohio Lucas  Michigan  Monroe  Wayne  -0.2  -0.1 
Ohio Ashtabula  Pennsylvania  Erie   -0.4  -0.6 
Ohio Ashtabula  Pennsylvania  Crawford    0.6  1.0 
Ohio Trumbull  Pennsylvania  Mercer  Venango  -1.3  -1.2 
Ohio Mahoning  Pennsylvania  Lawrence  Butler  -0.3  -0.1 
Ohio Columbiana  Pennsylvania  Beaver  Allegheny  0.4  -1.5 
Ohio Lawrence  West  Virginia  Wayne  Mingo  0.5  -0.2 
Ohio Lawrence  West  Virginia  Cabell  Lincoln  -0.3  -0.5 
Ohio Gallia  West  Virginia  Mason  Putnam  0.5  1.2 
Ohio Meigs  West  Virginia  Mason  Putnam  0.9  0.8 
Ohio Meigs  West  Virginia  Jackson  Roane  2.1  0.7 
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Ohio Athens  West  Virginia  Wood  Wirt  0.7  -0.5 
Ohio Washington  West  Virginia  Wood  Wirt  0.3  -0.1 
Ohio Washington  West  Virginia  Pleasants  Ritchie  2.3  0.3 
Ohio Monroe  West  Virginia  Tyler  Doddridge -0.3  0.4 
Ohio Monroe  West  Virginia  Wetzel  Harrison  -2.2  -0.5 
Ohio Belmont  West  Virginia  Marshall    1.0  0.3 
Ohio Belmont  West  Virginia  Ohio    -1.8  -0.9 
Ohio Jefferson  West  Virginia  Brooke    0.0  0.1 
Ohio Jefferson  West  Virginia  Hancock    1.6  0.6 
Connecticut  Litchfield  Massachusetts  Berkshire    -1.9  -0.7 
Connecticut  Hartford  Massachusetts  Hampden  Hampshire  -0.1  0.0 
Connecticut  Tolland  Massachusetts  Hampden  Hampshire  -1.0  -0.5 
Connecticut  Windham  Massachusetts  Worcester  1.1  0.2 
Alabama Baldwin  Florida  Escambia    -1.3 0.4 
Alabama Escambia  Florida  Escambia    -1.2 0.0 
Alabama Escambia  Florida  Santa  Rosa  -1.7  -0.5 
Alabama Covington  Florida  Okaloosa    -2.1  -1.4 
Alabama Covington  Florida  Walton   -0.7  -0.4 
Alabama Geneva  Florida  Holmes Washington  -1.3  -1.1 
Alabama Houston  Florida  Jackson Calhoun  -1.4  -0.4 
Alabama Lauderdate  Mississippi  Tishomingo  Alcorn  5.4 4.0 
Alabama Colbert Mississippi  Tishomingo Prentiss  4.2  3.3 
Alabama Franklin  Mississippi  Itawamba  Lee  -7.2  -3.1 
Alabama Marion Mississippi  Itawamba  Lee  -1.7  -0.8 
Alabama Lamar  Mississippi  Monroe Chicksaw  0.4 2.3 
Alabama Pickens  Mississippi  Lowndes  Oktibbeha  2.4 0.9 
Alabama Pickens  Mississippi  Noxubee  Winston  2.1 1.2 
Alabama Sumter Mississippi  Kemper Neshoba  -0.3  -2.0 
Alabama Sumter Mississippi  Lauderdale  Newton  -0.8  -0.3 
Alabama Choctaw  Mississippi Clarke  Jasper  4.9  4.5 
Alabama Washington  Mississippi  Wayne  Jones  2.4 1.8 
Alabama Washington  Mississippi Greene  Perry  1.8  3.4 
Alabama Mobile Mississippi George  Stone  0.0  1.0 
Alabama Mobile Mississippi  Jackson Harrison  -0.8  -0.3 
Alabama Lauderdale  Tennessee  Wayne  Perry  -0.1  -0.7 
Alabama Lauderdale  Tennessee  Lawrence  Lewis  -0.2  -1.4 
Alabama Limstone  Tennessee  Giles  Maury  2.2 1.9 
Alabama Madison  Tennessee  Lincoln Marshall  2.8 1.6 
Alabama Jackson  Tennessee  Franklin  Coffee  -2.4  -2.0 
Alabama Jackson  Tennessee  Marion Grundy  0.2  -1.5 
Pennsylvania  Beaver  West Virginia  Hancock    -3.2  -1.0 
Pennsylvania  Washington  West Virginia  Brooke    -0.9  0.7 
Pennsylvania  Washington  West Virginia  Ohio    -1.2  -0.3 
Pennsylvania  Greene  West Virginia  Marshall    -0.7  0.0 
Pennsylvania  Greene  West Virginia  Monongalia  Marion  -3.2  -1.8 
Pennsylvania  Fayette  West Virginia  Preston  Barbour  -2.3  -1.7 
Georgia Seminole  Florida  Jackson  Washington  -1.8  -1.6 
Georgia Decatur  Florida  Gadsden  Liberty  -0.4  -0.1 
Georgia Grady Florida  Leon  Wakulla  0.6  -0.3 
Georgia Thomas  Florida  Jeferson  Taylor  0.0  0.1 
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Georgia Brooks  Florida  Madison  Taylor  4.7  1.9 
Georgia Lowndes  Florida  Madison  Lafayette  -1.0  0.7 
Georgia Echols  Florida  Hamilton  Suwannee  0.3  -1.5 
Georgia Clinch  Florida  Columbia  Gilchrist  -2.1  -0.9 
Georgia Ware  Florida  Baker  Union  -3.5  -2.9 
Georgia Charlton  Florida  Baker  Bradford  -5.1  -2.5 
Georgia Charlton  Florida  Nassau Duval  -3.4  -2.6 
Georgia Camden  Florida  Nassau Duval  -1.6  -0.5 
Massachusetts  Worcester  New Hampshire  Cheshire  Sullivan  -0.3  0.8 
Massachusetts  Middlesex  New Hampshire  Hillsborough  Merrimack  1.6  0.4 
Massachusetts  Essex  New Hampshire  Rockingham  Strafford  0.3  -0.3 
Nebraska Dakota Iowa  Woodbury  Ida  0.7 0.0 
Nebraska Thurston  Iowa  Monona Crawford  1.2 0.6 
Nebraska Burt  Iowa  Monona Crawford  -1.7  -1.0 
Nebraska Burt  Iowa  Harrison  Shelby  0.0  -1.0 
Nebraska Washington  Iowa  Harrison  Shelby  -1.2  -0.1 
Nebraska Douglas  Iowa  Pottawatamie  Cass  0.3 0.9 
Nebraska Sarpy  Iowa  Mills  Montgomery  -1.1 0.5 
Nebraska Cass  Iowa  Mills  Montgomery  -1.1  -0.2 
Nebraska Otoe  Iowa  Fremont Page  1.6 0.6 
Nebraska Nernaha  Missouri  Atchison  Nodaway  1.8 1.4 
Nebraska Richardson  Missouri  Holt  Nodaway  3.6 0.8 
Tennessee  Lauderdate  Arkansas  Mississippi  Craighead  -2.3  -0.2 
Tennessee  Tipton  Arkansas  Mississippi  Poinsett  -0.7  0.7 
Tennessee  Shelby  Arkansas  Crittenden  Cross  0.4  0.6 
Tennessee  Lake  Kentucky  Fulton  Hickman  7.5  3.7 
Tennessee  Obion  Kentucky  Fulton  Hickman  3.0  3.5 
Tennessee  Weakley  Kentucky  Graves  McCracken  1.6  1.3 
Tennessee  Henry  Kentucky  Calloway  Marshall  0.6  -0.4 
Tennessee  Stwewart  Kentucky  Trigg  Lyon  1.6  1.4 
Tennessee  Montgomery  Kentucky  Christian  Hopkins  1.8  1.2 
Tennessee  Montgomery  Kentucky  Todd  Muhlenberg  -1.1  -1.7 
Tennessee  Robertson  Kentucky  Logan  Butler  0.8  0.9 
Tennessee  Robertson  Kentucky  Simpson  Warren  0.0  0.7 
Tennessee  Summer  Kentucky  Simpson  Warren  -0.6  0.6 
Tennessee  Summer  Kentucky  Allen  Warren  2.6  3.2 
Tennessee  Macon  Kentucky  Allen  Barren  6.7  4.0 
Tennessee  Macon  Kentucky  Monroe  Barren  2.9  -0.4 
Tennessee  Clay  Kentucky  Monroe  Metcalfe  3.4  1.9 
Tennessee  Clay  Kentucky  Cumberland  Adair  2.3  3.0 
Tennessee  Pickett  Kentucky  Clinton  Russell  1.4  2.3 
Tennessee  Pickett  Kentucky  Wayne  Pulaski  0.3  1.5 
Tennessee  Scott  Kentucky  McCreary  Pulaski  -1.4  0.6 
Tennessee  Campbell  Kentucky  Whitley  Laurel  0.7  0.8 
Tennessee  Claibome  Kentucky  Bell  Clay  0.7  0.4 
Tennessee  Lake  Missouri  New Madrid  Stoddard  5.4  1.4 
Tennessee  Dyer  Missouri  Pemiscot  Dunklin  0.4  1.6 
Mississippi DeSoto  Arkansas  Crittenden Saint  Francis  -2.6  0.3 
Mississippi Tunica  Arkansas  Lee  Monroe  4.5  1.8 
Mississippi Coahoma Arkansas  Philips  Arkansas  1.2  1.6 
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Mississippi Bolivar  Arkansas  Desha  Lincoln  -1.7  0.4 
Mississippi Washington  Arkansas  Chicot  Ashley  -1.6  -1.1 
Kansas  Doniphan  Missouri  Holt  Nordaway  -2.1  -0.3 
Kansas  Doniphan  Missouri  Andrew  Gentry  -2.9  -0.7 
Kansas  Doniphan  Missouri  Buchanan  DeKalb  -1.5  -0.3 
Kansas  Atchison  Missouri  Buchanan  Clinton  0.8  -0.5 
Kansas  Leavenworth  Missouri  Platte  Clinton  4.7  2.2 
Kansas  Johnson  Missouri  Jackson  Lafayette  0.1  1.1 
Kansas  Miami  Missouri  Cass  Johnson  -1.4  -1.3 
Kansas  Linn  Missouri  Bates  Henry  0.1  -0.4 
Kansas  Bourbon  Missouri  Vemon  Cedar  -3.3  -4.4 
Kansas  Crawford  Missouri  Barton  Dade  4.6  3.5 
Kansas  Cherokee  Missouri  Jasper  Lawrence  1.9  0.1 
Michigan Gogebic  Wisconsin Iron  Ashland  2.5 1.2 
Michigan Gogebic  Wisconsin Vilas  Oneida  3.0 2.0 
Michigan Iron  Wisconsin Forest  Langlade  0.9 0.5 
Michigan Dickinson  Wisconsin Marinette  Oconto  4.7 3.5 
Michigan Menominee  Wisconsin Marinette  Oconto  2.4 2.5 
North Dakota  Pembina  Minnesota  Kittson  Roseau  0.5  2.2 
North Dakota  Walsh  Minnesota  Marshall  Beltrarni  -3.5  -1.4 
North Dakota  Grand Forks  Minnesota  Polk  Clearwater  2.6  1.9 
North Dakota  Traill  Minnesota  Norman  Mahnomen  -0.1  -1.1 
North Dakota  Cass  Minnesota  Clay  Becker  1.2  1.4 
North Dakota  Richland  Minnesota  Wilkin  Otter Tail  1.4  0.7 
West Virginia  Wayne  Kentucky  Boyd  Carter  0.3  0.6 
West Virginia  Wayne  Kentucky  Lawrence  Elliott  1.9  1.0 
West Virginia  Mingo  Kentucky  Martin  Johnson  1.0  1.1 
West Virginia  MIngo  Kentucky  Pike  Floyd  0.3  0.4 
Illinois  Jo Daviess  Iowa  Dubuque  Delaware  -0.8  0.6 
Illinois  Jo Daviess  Iowa  Jackson  Jones  -1.3  0.8 
Illinois  Carroll  Iowa  Jackson  Jones  -1.7  0.9 
Illinois  Whiteside  Iowa  Clinton  Cedar  0.1  -0.7 
Illinois  Rock Island  Iowa  Scott  Cedar  -0.4  -0.3 
Illinois  Rock Island  Iowa  Muscatine  Johnson  -0.3  -0.4 
Illinois  Mercer  Iowa  Louisa  Washington  1.3  0.4 
Illinois  Henderson  Iowa  Des Moines  Henry  2.4  1.5 
Illinois  Hancock  Iowa  Lee  Henry  1.4  1.5 
Louisiana Caddo  Arkansas  Miller  Hempstead  0.3  0.9 
Louisiana Bossier Arkansas  Lafayette  Hempstead  -1.6  1.9 
Louisiana Webster Arkansas  Columbia  Neveda  0.3 -0.2 
Louisiana Claiborne  Arkansas  Columbia  Ouachita  1.0  0.8 
Louisiana Union  Arkansas  Union  Calhoun  2.7  1.8 
Louisiana Morehouse  Arkansas  Ashley  Drew  -0.7  0.9 
Louisiana West  Carroll  Arkansas  Chicot  Drew  1.3  1.9 
Louisiana East  Carroll  Arkansas  Chicot  Drew  2.3  1.2 
Oklahoma  Delaware  Arkansas  Benton  Madison  2.0  1.8 
Oklahoma  Adair  Arkansas  Washington  Madison  2.1  2.1 
Oklahoma  Sequoyah  Arkansas  Crawford  Franklin  -0.3  0.3 
Oklahoma  Le Flore  Arkansas  Sebastian  Logan  2.5  2.0 
Oklahoma  Le Flore  Arkansas  Scott  Yell  0.9  0.3 
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Oklahoma  McCurtain  Arkansas  Polk  Montgomery  2.9  2.4 
Oklahoma  McCurtain  Arkansas  Sevier  Howard  0.7  2.5 
Oklahoma  McCurtain  Arkansas  Littler River  Hempstead  1.3  1.8 
Texas Bowie  Arkansas  Littler  River  Howard  -0.6  -1.6 
Texas Cass  Arkansas  Miller  Hempstead -1.2  -0.5 
Missouri  McDonald  Arkansas  Benton  Madison  3.0  1.1 
Missouri  Barry  Arkansas  Carroll  Madison  2.0  -0.4 
Missouri  Stone  Arkansas  Carroll  Newton  1.2  0.6 
Missouri  Taney  Arkansas  Boone  Newton  4.4  3.9 
Missouri  Ozark  Arkansas  Marion  Searcy  0.7  -0.7 
Missouri  Ozark  Arkansas  Baxter  Stone  0.9  -0.2 
Missouri  Howell  Arkansas  Fulton  Izard  -0.1  0.1 
Missouri  Oregon  Arkansas  Sharp  Independence  0.8  0.1 
Missouri  Oregon  Arkansas  Randolph  Lawrence  0.0  -0.7 
Missouri  Ripley  Arkansas  Randolph  Lawrence  1.3  1.3 
Missouri  Ripley  Arkansas  Clay    0.6  0.3 
Missouri  Butler  Arkansas  Clay    1.1  0.6 
Missouri  Dunklin  Arkansas  Clay    1.1  1.0 
Missouri  Dunklin  Arkansas  Greene  Lawrence  0.7  1.4 
Missouri  Dunklin  Arkansas  Mississippi  Poinsett  2.8  2.1 
Missouri  Pemiscot  Arkansas  Mississippi  Poinsett  2.5  0.9 
Missouri  Atchison  Iowa  Fremont    -3.2  3.4 
Missouri  Nodaway  Iowa  Page  Montgomery  -0.9  -0.4 
Missouri  Worth  Iowa  Taylor  Adams  -4.8  0.0 
Missouri  Worth  Iowa  Ringgold  Union  -4.1  0.2 
Missouri  Harrison  Iowa  Ringgold  Union  -1.2  0.0 
Missouri  Harrison  Iowa  Decatur  Clarke  1.4  0.9 
Missouri  Mercer  Iowa  Wayne  Lucas  9.5  10.1 
Missouri  Putnam  Iowa  Wayne  Lucas  -1.1  0.2 
Missouri  Putnam  Iowa  Appanoose  Monroe  -2.2  -0.3 
Missouri  Schuyler  Iowa  Davis  Wapello  1.1  -0.2 
Missouri  Scotland  Iowa  Van Buren  Jefferson  1.8  1.9 
Missouri  Clark  Iowa  Lee  Henry  3.6  3.0 
Wisconsin Vernon  Iowa  Allamakee  Winneshiek  2.4 -0.8 
Wisconsin Crawford  Iowa  Allamakee  Winneshiek  2.7  0.7 
Wisconsin Grant  Iowa  Clayton  Fayette  4.2  0.2 
Wisconsin Grant  Iowa  Dubuque Delaware  0.2 -1.0 
Wisconsin Douglas Minnesota  Carlton  Aitkin  0.1 -0.8 
Wisconsin Burnett  Minnesota  Pine  Kanabec  0.3 -1.2 
Wisconsin Polk  Minnesota  Chisago  Isanti  0.6  0.1 
Wisconsin St.  Croix Minnesota  Washington  Ramsey  0.4 -0.5 
Wisconsin Pierce  Minnesota  Goodhue Rice  1.1 -0.5 
Wisconsin Pepine  Minnesota  Wabasha Olmsted  2.3  0.9 
Wisconsin Buffalo  Minnesota  Wabasha Olmsted  2.4  1.2 
Wisconsin Buffalo  Minnesota  Winona  Olmsted  2.0  1.0 
Wisconsin Trempealeau  Minnesota  Winona  Olmsted  0.6 -0.2 
Wisconsin La  Crosse  Minnesota  Winnoa  Olmsted  0.5 -0.2 
Wisconsin La  Crosse  Minnesota  Houston  Filmore  1.5  0.2 
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